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COVID-19 outbreaks at nursing homes during the recent pandemic, which received ample
media coverage, may have lasting negative impacts on individuals’ perceptions regarding
nursing homes. We argue that this could have sizable and persistent implications for savings
and long-term care policies. We first develop a theoretical model predicting that higher nurs-
ing home aversion should induce higher savings and stronger support for policies subsidizing
home care. We further document, based on a survey on Canadians in their 50s and 60s, that
higher nursing home aversion is widespread: 72% of respondents are less inclined to enter a
nursing home because of the pandemic. Consistent with our model, we find that the latter
are much more likely to have higher intended savings for older age because of the pandemic.
We also find that they are more likely to strongly support home care subsidies.
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1 Introduction
In many countries including Canada and its provinces of Québec and Ontario, the recent COVID-
19 pandemic has shed light on the precarious sanitary conditions of the elderly population
and, in particular, of those in nursing homes. There has been extensive media coverage of the
dramatic consequences of COVID in nursing homes, with its population being the most hit by
the pandemic. As we detail in Section 2, in the first wave (March to August 2020), more than
80% of the Canadian COVID deaths were reported in nursing and seniors’ homes (Canadian
Institute for Health Information, 2020). More generally, the pandemic has put nursing homes
in the spotlight in terms of how they are managed (even before the pandemic hit), of their lack
of staff and of the consequences of a pandemic on the living conditions of the dependent elderly
in these facilities.
As a consequence, the pandemic has increased awareness of the population regarding their
long-term care (hereafter LTC) needs in case they become dependent and may have affected
permanently their preferences regarding future LTC solutions.1 The pandemic has then led
policy makers and the population in general to think about alternative solutions to nursing
home care. One alternative solution is to receive LTC at home. The main concern for the
home-care option is its (out-of-pocket) costs. Home care is much more expensive than public
nursing home care, in particular if dependents do not have family members that can provide
informal care (see Section 2 where we compare the costs of nursing homes versus home care).
The pandemic has pushed society to reconsider the attractiveness of home versus nursing
home care. Because individuals are planning today the financial resources they will need tomor-
row in case they become dependent, they may wish to adapt their saving plans as well. In the
same way, policy makers will need to develop better suited LTC policies. Those public solutions
are multiple: build new nursing homes, foster the training of LTC workers, but also make the
home care option more affordable through, for instance, subsidies and tax exemptions.2
Developing adequate LTC policies regarding the type of care provision and financing solutions
is crucial. Indeed, in every developed countries, population is aging, implying that the fraction
of people with very specific health needs is growing. According to OECD (2011), the fraction of
people aged 80 and above is expected to grow from 4% of the total OECD population in 2010
to 10% in 2050. Canada is not exempt from this trend. For instance, Clavet et al. (2021) have
estimated that the number of individuals needing help with activities of daily living (hereafter
ADLs) in Québec is likely to almost double, from 315,000 in 2020 to more than 600,000 in 2050.
If many households plan to use a more costly option of LTC post-pandemic, they will most likely
1LTC is defined as “the day-to-day help with activities such as washing and dressing, or help with household
activities such as cleaning and cooking” (OECD, 2011). LTC often comes with additional type of support such
as medical assistance. Individuals in need of LTC are called dependent.
2Those debates are not limited to the Canadian context that we study. For instance, increasing government
spending on home health care to avoid reliance on nursing homes is currently debated in the US (see https:
//www.nytimes.com/2021/08/26/briefing/biden-economy-package.html).
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need to save more in order to finance it. But this form of self-insurance is costly and it may call
for increased policy intervention.
The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the potential impact of the
recent COVID pandemic on LTC preferences, and on how these shifts in expected LTC choices
result in changes in saving behavior and LTC policy preferences. The paper also provides a
theoretical model highlighting the underlying mechanisms behind the changes caused by the
pandemic.
The COVID pandemic can have two long term implications. First, people may believe in
the possibility of a recurring pandemic and, they may also believe that a nursing home does not
provide much protection against such risks. Second, it might have worsened individuals’ view on
nursing home care even in the absence of a pandemic, in the long-run, as they were confronted
with more (negative) information about the quality of nursing home care. Our paper evaluates
how preferences for home care or nursing home care may have been (durably) affected by the
pandemic. In particular, we study, both theoretically and empirically, how a stronger preference
for home care post-pandemic may have changed saving decisions and the support for a public
policy promoting home care.
We propose a model where individuals differ in their preference for home care, or equivalently
in their degree of aversion to nursing home. We assume, as observed empirically, that home care
is more expensive than nursing home care. We first develop the model in the absence of any
pandemic risk that could affect nursing home aversion. We show that those who plan to use
home care, a more costly option than nursing home care, would choose to save more. We
then introduce a pandemic risk which worsens the view on nursing home care. As highlighted
previously, this results either from a higher (perceived) probability of catching a pandemic-
related disease in nursing homes, or from a higher degree of nursing home aversion reflecting
new (negative) information about nursing home quality in general. In our framework, the two
turn out to be isomorphic. We then show that, following a pandemic, a higher proportion of
households prefer the home care option and that, in order to finance this choice, they choose
to save more. We finally introduce public intervention taking the form of a home care subsidy,
financed by taxation. We show that support for such a policy is likely to increase post-pandemic.
We also show that the increase in support is across the board and not limited to those who were
already in favor pre-pandemic.
We then confront these theoretical results to empirical findings. To do so, we have partnered
in the fall 2020 with Asking Canadians, a Canadian online panel survey organization, to field a
survey on the LTC-related preferences of the elderly. The survey was fielded to 3,004 Ontarian
and Québec respondents. The survey targeted respondents between 50 and 69 years old, with
the intention of learning people’s LTC choices in the new normal after the current pandemic,
instead of choices during the pandemic. The survey asked questions regarding how LTC prefer-
ences, saving behaviour and preferences for public policies were affected by the recent COVID
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pandemic.
The survey evidence is in line with the predictions of the theoretical model. We find a
widespread increase in nursing home aversion post-pandemic: 72% of the sample report to be
less inclined to enter a nursing home. Also, about 70% of the sample report that their view
on the exposure to health risks in nursing homes worsened after the pandemic. At the same
time, many respondents are aware that the home care option is more costly and hence, they
would have to save more to finance that option. Consistent with our theoretical model, about a
quarter of the sample report that they indeed plan to save more for old age because of COVID,
and the vast majority of them say that these increased planned savings are intended to avoid
entering a nursing home. We further confirm that this positive association between increased
planned savings and increased nursing home aversion is robust to controlling for many potential
confounding factors. Specifically, we find that increased nursing home aversion is associated
with a higher probability of increased planned savings of 8.5 to 14.0 percentage points. This is
sizable and corresponds to 31.6% to 52.0% of the unconditional (weighted) mean probability of
26.9%. Overall, our results thus suggest that the pandemic may have a significant lasting effect
on intended savings for old age because of increased nursing home aversion and thus increased
willingness to rely on home care.
Lastly, we document a strong support for a policy that would subsidize home care with 70%
of our sample either “very much agreeing” or “agreeing” with it. This suggests that such a
policy could have broad electoral support. Furthermore, consistent with the predictions of our
model, we find strong evidence that the increased support for such a policy post-pandemic is
driven by increased nursing home aversion. Quantitatively, we find that increased nursing home
aversion is associated with a higher probability to “very much agree” with such a policy of 7.3
to 11.8 percentage points. This corresponds to 36.1% to 58.4% of the unconditional (weighted)
mean probability which is of 20.2%.
Our paper is related to the following strands of the literature. The first one is the growing
literature on the design of appropriate LTC insurance (LTCI) policies. So far, this literature
has mostly concentrated on the reasons behind the existence of a “LTCI puzzle” (namely, the
lack of private LTCI worldwide) and on how governments could incentivize LTCI purchase.3
There is also an expanding literature on the value of (partial) public insurance (De Nardi et al.,
2016; Braun et al., 2017; Achou, 2020, to name a few). Most of these studies do not consider
individuals’ choices between nursing home care and home care (one exception is Koreshkova and
Lee, 2020, who study these choices using a structural model). We contribute to this literature
by first, proposing a theoretical model on how a pandemic can affect the relative preferences for
the two LTC options, and second, by showing whether this is supported by empirical evidence.
Our results then shed light on how to redesign public LTC policies post-pandemic. Our paper
3About the LTCI puzzle, see the surveys by Brown and Finkelstein (2009), OECD (2011) and, Pestieau and
Ponthiere (2011).
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is also related to the literature on old-age savings as a form of self-insurance for late-in-life
risks (e.g. Palumbo, 1999; Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007; De Nardi et al., 2010; Ameriks et al.,
2011; Kopecky and Koreshkova, 2014; Lockwood, 2018; Ameriks et al., 2020). We contribute
to this literature by showing that nursing home aversion due to the pandemic can increase the
willingness to save for older ages.
Finally, our paper contributes to the recent and prolific literature on the effect of a pandemic,
and specifically of the COVID-19, on different economic outcomes. That literature studies both
micro (for instance, the costs and benefits of specific confinement measures) and macro (for
instance, the effects of the pandemic on trade, labour markets and the economic activity in
general) outcomes.4 Directly related to our paper, Hurwitz et al. (2021) seek to understand
the potential long-run implications of the pandemic on savings for retirement. Yet, although
the pandemic has hit primarily the (dependent) elderly and especially those in nursing homes,
we are unaware of any specific analysis of the changes in preferences for home care and nursing
home care, and of their impacts on savings and political support for home care post-pandemic.
One exception is the survey conducted by the National Institute on Aging (2021) that asks
questions similar to ours regarding the preferences of Canadians toward nursing home care and
state intervention, as well as about their beliefs about health risk exposure and how they have
changed due to pandemic. They find that 96% of the respondents who participated in the
survey, aged 65 years and older, report that, as they get older, they will do everything they can
to avoid moving into a nursing home and that 86% considered that LTC should be part of an
integrated health system. Compared to this paper, our study provides a theoretical model that
allows us to form sharp predictions on the impact of the pandemic on intended savings as well
as on the support for a specific LTC policy (home-care subsidy). Then, we conduct an empirical
analysis to demonstrate that nursing home aversion post-pandemic is indeed the main driving
force behind the increase in intended savings and supports for such a policy.
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide the institutional back-
ground regarding the organization of the LTC sector in Canada and how COVID affected this
sector. In Section 3, we develop a theoretical model explaining individual choices of care, savings
and preference for state intervention, both in the absence of a pandemic risk and then allowing
for it. In Section 4, we describe our sample. In Section 5, we provide the empirical results
obtained from our survey, regarding nursing home aversion, changes in intended savings, and
support for a public policy promoting home care, following the COVID hit. The last section
concludes.
4For instance, Gollier (2020) studies the costs and benefits of different strategies to lift lockdowns while Salanié
and Treich (2020) compare public and private incentives for protection against the pandemic risk. Antras et al.
(2020), Bonadio et al. (2021), Bricongne et al. (2021) study the impact of COVID on trade and globalisation,
while Kahn et al. (2020), Cajner et al. (2020), and Kurmann et al. (2021) analyze its impact on labour markets
and on firms.
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2 The institutional background
In this paper, we concentrate on individuals’ choices for home care versus nursing home care, in
case they face dependency. Our survey has asked a panel of 3,004 respondents, from Ontario and
Québec, as to their preferences for these two options, taking into account the different features of
home care and nursing home care. In this section, we provide an overview of the characteristics
of each care option in Québec and Ontario.
We start by explaining the differences in prices paid by the elderly. If the dependent elderly
enters a nursing home (private or public), the latter will provide services such as personal services
(e.g. toileting and dressing), meal preparation, and nursing/medical services. In addition, it also
provides basic (hygienic) goods and services so that, apart from the price paid for the nursing
home, the elderly has to bear very few extra expenses.
The rates for a place in a nursing home vary across provinces. In Ontario, the maximum
rates for an accommodation in a public nursing home are legally set by the Ministry of Long-
Term Care and ranged, in 2019, from 1,891 CAD for a basic accommodation to 2,280 CAD for
a semi-private room and 2,701 CAD for a private one. These costs can be partly covered by a
subsidy, whose maximum is 1,891 CAD per month and is conditional on individuals’ financial
situation. In particular, to be eligible for this subsidy, the elderly needs to be already receiving
all provincial and federal benefits such as the Old Age Security (OAS), the Ontario Disability
support program and the Guaranteed Income Security (GIS), and the subsidy will depend on
their net income.5 In Québec, the setup is similar to that in Ontario. The prices of public
nursing home care (also called CHSLD) depend on the type of accommodation, and range from
1,223 CAD (for a basic accommodation) to 1,642 CAD (for a semi-private room) and 1,966 CAD
(for a private room). The program is means-tested and the out-of-pocket price for public nursing
home care can be reduced depending on the financial situation (savings, home-ownership and
monthly income) of the dependent elderly as well as on his marital status.6
One crucial issue with public nursing homes (both in Ontario and in Québec) is the significant
delays between the time an individual is declared having issues with ADLs and the time she/he
enters a public nursing home. Data on waiting times are relatively scarce. In Québec, in 2017,
the waiting time was around 10 months, with a lot of variations across regions (Commissaire à la
Santé et au Bien-être, 2017). In Ontario, according to the Waiting Time Alliance (WTA) report,
the median waiting time was evaluated to be around 108 days in 2013-2014.7 As mentioned in a
report of the Commission de la Santé et des Services Sociaux (2016) for Québec, these waiting
times would have the undesirable consequence of pushing the elderly to enter a nursing home







For these reasons, the elderly dependent may instead choose to enter a private nursing home
(not under agreement), for which there are usually no waiting times.9 In Québec, they range
from 5,000 CAD to 8,000 CAD a month.10
Another alternative for the elderly facing issues with ADLs is to stay at home and to resort to
home care. At-home services can take various forms such as meal preparation, personal services
(e.g. toileting and dressing) and nursing services. Depending on the type of service required,
the price of one hour of skilled nursing care varies between 15 CAD and 85 CAD in Québec,
and between 23 CAD and 70 CAD in Ontario.11 Even if these services give rights to tax credits,
home care can soon become disproportionately expensive.12 Take for example the situation of
a dependent elderly who would require (only) 4 hours of care 7 days a week, the monthly cost
of home care would be around 4,300 CAD if the cost of one hour of care is (only of) 35 CAD.
This does not even take into account, that, in addition to the costs of home care services, the
elderly, staying at home, will have to bear extra expenses such as food, hygienic products, clothes
washing (expenses that are included in the rate of a nursing home). The individual will also have
to bear additional expenses related to lodging such as house maintenance, mortgages, rents or
electricity bills, which, by definition, are included in the nursing home rate. Importantly, while
some policy programs help finance home care costs, they turn out to often cover only a small
share of these costs. For instance, Tousignant et al. (2007) estimate that only 8% of home care
needs are covered by the public system in Quebec. As a result, even more so than for the nursing
home option, individuals relying on home care face huge out-of-pocket costs and so need to rely
even more on dissaving, selling a home or using a reverse mortgage to finance LTC expenses.13
This is particularly the case as in Canada, like in many other OECD countries, private LTC
insurance is almost nonexistent (see OECD, 2011 and Boyer et al., 2020).
Nonetheless, the pandemic may have made the home care option more attractive as, espe-
cially during the first wave, nursing homes experienced a large number of outbreaks and deaths
both in Québec and Ontario. At the end of this first wave (May 2020), in Québec, more than
90% of the COVID deaths had occurred among individuals aged 70 and more, and around 70%
of those deaths had occurred in nursing homes.14 Similarly, in Ontario, more than 70% of the
COVID deaths by the end of May 2020 had occurred in nursing homes.15
9There are two types of private nursing homes. Those under agreement are privately managed but receive
contributions from the government. As a result, they face the same rules and are imposed to charge the same
fees as public nursing homes. From a patient viewpoint, they are thus very similar to public nursing homes.
Those which are not under agreement do not receive contributions from the government and have more freedom
regarding their operations (although they need a license) and the fees they can charge to residents. When we
refer to private nursing homes, we thus refer to the latter type.
10https://bonjourresidences.com/blogue/couts-hebergement-chsld/
11These values were obtained from the Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association (CLHIA 2018).
12In Québec, the non-refundable tax credit lies between 20% and 35% of all LTC expenses, with a cap on the
claimed amount of LTC expenses at home (see Revenu Québec, 2019).
13The reverse mortgage option is not very developed in Canada.
14Institut National de la Santé Publique du Québec.
15See https://covid-19.ontario.ca/data/long-term-care-homes for the cumulative number of COVID
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Many press releases reported that, in these nursing homes, some of the care takers left their
jobs because they themselves had COVID, because of bad and unsafe working conditions, or
because of work overload.16 This had the consequence of placing residents at increased risk by
leaving them in bad living conditions (not bathed, not fed enough, and not medicated). For
instance, in its report, the Protecteur du Citoyen (the ombudsman for Québec) mentions that
46% of the residents and 60% of their relatives reported that the quality of care decreased or was
insufficient during the first wave, in particular for basic and hygienic care.17 At some nursing
homes, appropriate health and satefy measures required for COVID patients have not been
taken, which led to many COVID deaths.18
Finally, in this work, we do not consider the choice between public and private nursing
homes for two reasons. First, prior to the pandemic, several professionals from the LTC sector
that we consulted told us that there is no clear evidence that private nursing homes offer a
better quality of care than public ones. Instead, as mentioned above, the main difference they
highlighted was related to waiting times and location choices. Second, both in Québec and
Ontario, the pandemic affected strongly both private and public nursing homes, and quality
shortages were not confined to public nursing homes.19 As a consequence, we do not expect the
pandemic to increase the attractiveness of private nursing homes relative to public ones, which
is indeed verified by responses to our survey (see Section 5). Instead, given that both public and
private nursing homes experienced a large number of COVID outbreaks in the first wave and
that the press reported quality shortages in both types of institutions, we focus on the choice
between home and nursing home care.
3 The model
We model a two-period setting. In the first period, all agents have the same endowment, and
choose how much to save for the second period, with saving being their only source of income.
All agents face two risks that may realize or not at the beginning of the second period of their
life: (i) dependency and (ii) catching a disease associated with a possible future pandemic, which
can be seen as being similar to COVID in 2020. Agents are homogeneous in both the probability
of dependency and of catching the disease. The only decision to be taken in the second period is
deaths at Ontarian nursing homes by date and see https://covid-19.ontario.ca/data for the total cumulative
number of COVID deaths in Ontario by date.
16From March to May 2020, infections among staffs at nursing homes and residential homes represented more
than 10% of Canada’s total cases (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2020).
17See https://protecteurducitoyen.qc.ca/sites/default/files/pdf/rapports_speciaux/
rapport-etape-premiere-vague-covid-19-chsld.pdf
18See for instance, press releases about CHSLD Le Herron, in Québec.
19For an example of a negative press coverage during the pandemic about private nursing homes,
see for instance: https://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/2021-03-16/chsld-prives-non-conventionnes/
quebec-doit-serrer-la-vis.php.
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for dependent agents to choose whether they prefer home care (HC, hereafter in this section) or
moving to a nursing home (NH, hereafter in this section), which we call the care type decision.20
For pedagogical reasons, we first develop the model in the absence of a pandemic-risk in
Section 3.1. This allows us to look at the determinants of the choice between HC and NH, in
the absence of a pandemic risk. We then introduce the pandemic risk in the model in Section
3.2, in order to see how it affects both the saving and the care type decisions of the elderly.
Finally, in Section 3.3, we introduce a social insurance program that would subsidize HC. We
study how the perceptions (of costs and of probabilities of catching the disease as a function of
care type, such as the relatively higher pandemic risk in NH shown in Section 2) affect the care
type preferences, saving decisions as well as the preferences for public insurance.
3.1 The model with no pandemic risk
Agents all have the same endowment W in the first period. In the first period, they choose how
much to save, denoted by s, and in the second period, if they become dependent, whether to use
HC (1HC = 1) or NH (1HC = 0). To simplify (and without loss of generality for our results),
we assume away any discounting between the two periods, as well as any real return on saving.
Agents all face the same probability p of becoming dependent at the beginning of the second
period.
At the beginning of the first period, agents’ expected utility is given by
u1(W − s) + (1− p)u(s) + p [1HCvHC(s) + (1− 1HC) vNH(s)] , (1)
where u1(x) denotes the first-period utility function, u(x) the second-period utility function in
case of good health, and vj(x) with j = {NH,HC} the utility function of dependent agents as
a function of their care type choice. All utility functions are increasing and (weakly) concave in
consumption x. The function u(.) also satisfies the Inada condition that limx→0 u
′(x)→ +∞.
We assume that the type of care affects individual preferences in two directions. First, each
type of care is associated with an out-of-pocket cost for the dependent agent, denoted by Lj .
21
In the following, relying on the empirical evidence presented in Section 2, we assume that the
out-of-pocket cost of HC is higher than the out-of-pocket cost of NH, that is LHC > LNH . We
also assume that W > LHC > LNH .
22
20We assume that households do not have private LTC insurance. As already mentioned in Section 2, very few
people purchase private LTCI (the so-called LTCI puzzle). Also, we do not make the distinction between private
and public nursing homes in studying the care type decision. Implicitly, we assume that the default NH option is
the public one given its lower cost and apparently-equivalent quality relative to its private counterpart.
21Any existing social LTCI (such as subsidies or tax credits) covering LTC expenses is already embedded here,
since we consider out-of-pocket expenses. The important assumption here is that the amount of social LTCI is
exogenously set.
22In our model, for simplicity, there is just one intensity of care needs if dependent. The main intuitions would
hold if we assumed instead a distribution of intensity of care needs conditional on being dependent inducing
a distribution for the cost of HC, LHC (LNH is not a function of the severity of care needs in the public NH
considered here). In that case, the LTC choice in the second period would be characterized by a probability of
9
Second, agents differ in their intrinsic preference for HC vs NH. We model this by using an
additive term θ to the utility obtained with HC, so that the utility functions are such that
vNH(x) = u(x− LNH),
vHC(x) = u(x− LHC) + θ.
Agents are aware of their type, defined by their value of θ, while the econometrician does not
observe each individual θ’s value, but instead knows that θ is distributed over [0, θmax] according
to distribution function f(θ) and cumulative distribution F (θ).





Agents have to choose s (in the first period) and IHC ∈ {0, 1} (at the beginning of the second
period) to maximize their expected utility. We solve this problem in two steps. First, agents
decide how much to save conditional on each care type. Second, they compare their utility levels
in HC and NH, and choose the best among the two options.




EUj = u1(W − s) + (1− p)u(s) + pvj(s).
Defining first-period consumption as c = W − s, the first-order condition (hereafter, FOC) with
respect to s is:
∂EUj
∂s
= −u′1(c) + (1− p)u′(s) + pu′(s− Lj) = 0, (2)
which depends on the type of care chosen, j = {NH,HC}. Under the Inada condition (u′(0)→
∞), we always have s∗ > 0.
It is straightforward to see that a higher Lj increases the marginal benefit from saving, so
that s∗HC > s
∗
NH when LHC > LNH .
Let us now find how agents make their choice between NH and HC. They will choose HC
over NH if:
VHC(θ) = u1(W − s∗HC) + (1− p)u(s∗HC) + p (u(s∗HC − LHC) + θ)
> VNH = u1(W − s∗NH) + (1− p)u(s∗NH) + pu(s∗NH − LNH),
where s∗j is defined by (2).
using each option conditional on being dependent. The main intuitions from our model would apply in such a
framework.
23This relationship (i.e. higher marginal utility under dependency than under autonomy) is quite standard in
the literature. See, among others, Courbage and Eeckhoudt (2012), Cremer and Pestieau (2014), De Donder and
Leroux (2013), Canta et al. (2016), De Donder and Pestieau (2017), Klimaviciute and Pestieau (2018), Courbage
and Montoliu-Montes (2018), Ameriks et al. (2020), Leroux and Pestieau (2020).
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Denote ∆V (θ) = VHC(θ) − VNH . Note first that ∆V (0) < 0 since LHC > LNH (even if
agents can adapt their saving level, it is easy to see that utility decreases with Lj). Moreover,
since ∆V (θ) increases with θ, we denote by θ̂ the type of the agent indifferent between HC and
NH.24 It satisfies ∆V (θ̂) = 0 or equivalently,
pθ̂ = u1(W − s∗NH)− u1(W − s∗HC) + (1− p) (u(s∗NH)− u(s∗HC))
+p (u(s∗NH − LNH)− u(s∗HC − LHC)) .




= −u′(s∗NH − LNH) < 0,
∂θ̂
∂LHC
= u′(s∗HC − LHC) > 0.
Hence, an increase in LNH (resp. in LHC) moves θ̂ to the left (resp. to the right) so that fewer








u′1(W − s∗NH)− u′1(W − s∗HC)
]
≤ 0,
because additional income increases the utility with HC more than that with NH (since s∗HC >
s∗NH implies a smaller first-period consumption level in HC). An exogenous increase in income
then increases the number of agents choosing HC over NH, everything else constant.26
The results of this section are summarized below:
Proposition 1. In the absence of a pandemic risk, individuals save more if they want to use
HC rather than NH in case they become dependent.
An increase in the cost of nursing home care, LNH (resp. home care, LHC) increases (resp.
decreases) the number of individuals resorting to home care.
3.2 Introducing a pandemic risk
We now introduce a pandemic risk, and see how it impacts individual choices. This pandemic
can be seen as being similar to the COVID pandemic in the sense that, as it was observed in
Canada (see Section 2), it is likely to hit more severely individuals in NH.
This pandemic risk is associated with a utility cost C for the person who catches the disease.
This assumption seems more in line with the intuition than a monetary cost. Also, Canada
24We implicitly assume that the maximum value of θ, θmax, is large enough that ∆V (θmax) > 0 so that some
people prefer HC, in accordance with reality.
25In the following, when applicable, we use of the envelop theorem for s∗NH and s
∗
HC .
26In Section 3.3, we introduce the assumption that the first-period utility is linear in consumption, so that
u1(x) = x. In that case, income W has no impact on the decision to choose HC over NH.
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(as most advanced countries) has a social health insurance system that covers most if not all
pandemic-related health expenditures, so that the out-of-pocket cost of the pandemic disease
is in general low. Agents rather fear the risk of complications and of dying, which is better
represented as an (non insurable) utility cost.
Agents all face the same probability pC of catching the disease if either not dependent or in
HC.27 We open up the possibility that this probability is larger in NH, and equal to βpC with
β > 1. Note that what we care about is the individuals’ perceived probability of risk exposure
in NH, as this is what will drive their preference for care type (and for saving). As explained in
Section 2, the press has largely disseminated the idea that NH was not a safe environment, at
least during the first COVID wave, and that the elderly in these facilities were particularly at
risk of infection (evidence indeed showed that infection rates in NH were much higher than in
the rest of the population). For that reason, it seems reasonable to assume that agents perceive
the risk of catching the disease as being higher in NH than at home, and to set β > 1. We
assume that the probabilities p and pC are independent from each other.
Agents’ ex ante expected utility is then given by:
EUj = u1(W − s) + (1− p) [(1− pC)u(s) + pC (u(s)− C)]
+p [(1− pC,j)vj(s) + pC,j (vj(s)− C)]
= u1(W − s) + (1− p) [u(s)− pCC] + p [vj(s)− pC,jC] ,




= −u′1(c) + (1− p)u′(s) + pu′(s− Lj) = 0. (3)
This is the same FOC as without a pandemic risk, and we thus have that s∗HC > s
∗
NH > 0 since
LHC > LNH . This means that, for a given choice of care, neither β nor C has an impact on
saving levels.
Agents choose HC over NH if:
VHC(θ) = u1(W − s∗HC) + (1− p) [u(s∗HC)− CpC ]
+ p [u(s∗HC − LHC)− CpC + θ]
> VNH = u(W − s∗NH) + (1− p) [u(s∗NH)− CpC ]
+ p [u(s∗NH − LNH)− βCpC ] ,
where s∗j is defined by (3). We then obtain that the threshold type, θ̂, is given by ∆V (θ̂) = 0,
so that
pθ̂ = u1(W − s∗NH)− u1(W − s∗HC) + (1− p) [u(s∗NH)− u(s∗HC)]
+p [u(s∗NH − LNH)− u(s∗HC − LHC) + (1− β)CpC ] , (4)
27Note that we could assume that, for those living in the community (as opposed to a nursing home), the risk
of catching the disease (pC and C) is different depending on whether the individual is healthy or dependent. Our
results would remain qualitatively unchanged, at the cost of a more cumbersome notation.
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and with all agents θ < θ̂ (resp., θ > θ̂) preferring NH to HC (resp., the opposite). Note that
an increase in the pandemic risk, through either higher β,C or pC , is isomorphic to an increase
in θ.
Like in the previous section, we find that an increase in LNH (resp. in LHC) decreases (resp.,




= −CpC < 0,
dθ̂
dC
= (1− β)pC < 0,
dθ̂
dpC
= (1− β)C < 0.
In words, increasing either the health cost of the disease C or the relative exposure to a pandemic
in NH compared to HC (β) makes NH less palatable so that θ̂ decreases. Note that θ̂ decreases
with pC as well (since the impact of a higher pC is larger in NH than in HC).
Proposition 2. When there exists a pandemic risk, an increase in (i) the baseline probability,
pC , of catching the disease, (ii) the perceived additional risk exposure to the pandemic in NH, β,
and (iii) the utility cost, C, associated with the disease all decrease the number of agents willing
to use the NH option, and increase the savings of those who switch from NH to HC, from s∗NH
to s∗HC .
Before going further let us note an interesting feature of our model, resulting from the
isomorphism between a positive shock to θ and an increase in the expected cost of the disease
associated with NH, pCβC. There are two different stories regarding the impact of the current
pandemic on the choice of care in the future. The first is that, for a given distribution of the
θs, a higher perceived risk of catching the disease under a potential future pandemic pushes
individuals to switch from NH to HC. The second story highlights that as people are exposed
more to (negative) information on NH during the current pandemic, it may impact permanently
their preference for NH even if they do not fear a new pandemic in the future.
In that sense, NH aversion (or the increased preference for HC) can be modeled either by an
increase in the perceived expected cost of the disease (through higher β,C or pC), or by a shock
on the preference θ for HC. All have the same implications in terms of savings and also in terms
of support for public policy for HC (see below).
3.3 Introducing a public subsidy for HC
Let us assume now that the government considers introducing a policy which would provide a
benefit P to agents choosing HC. It is financed by a lump-sum tax T on all individuals in the
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first period. We assume throughout that LHC − LNH > P > 0 so that the transfer partially
compensates the extra cost of HC.
The reason why we consider a public policy directly targeted toward HC is related to the
fact that the public system covers only a very small share of home care needs. As a result, to
cover their care needs, individuals would face a much higher out-of-pocket cost for HC (even
after tax credits) than for NH (see Section 2). The recent COVID pandemic has amplified the
urge to find solutions that would make HC more affordable.
In case of HC choice, the individual maximizes the following expected utility function,
EUHC = u1(W − s− T ) + (1− p)u(s) + p[u(s+ P − LHC) + θ]− CpC .
Using backward induction, we solve first for the optimal saving level, and then we study the
individuals’ preferences over the public policy.
We now introduce the following assumption, for the sake of simplicity:
Assumption 1. u1(x) = x.




= −1 + (1− p)u′(s) + pu′(s+ P − LHC) = 0. (5)
For those who plan on using HC, under Assumption 1, the amount of saving is not affected by
the tax T but decreases with the subsidy P . We then denote it by s∗HC(P ).
For agents choosing NH, the problem is now to maximize:
EUNH = u1(W − s− T ) + (1− p)u(s) + pu(s− LNH)− CpC (1 + p (β − 1)) . (6)
Under Assumption 1, the level of savings, s∗NH satisfies
∂EUNH
∂s
= −1 + (1− p)u′(s) + pu′(s− LNH) = 0, (7)
which is affected neither by T nor by P .
Agents choose HC over NH if:
VHC(θ) = u1(W − s∗HC(P )− T ) + (1− p)u(s∗HC(P )) + pu(s∗HC(P ) + P − LHC)− CpC + pθ
> VNH = u1(W − s∗NH − T ) + (1− p)u(s∗NH) + pu(s∗NH − LNH)− CpC (1 + p (β − 1)) ,
28The solution is always interior (s∗j > 0 ∀j = {HC,NH}) thanks to the Inada condition for the function u(x).
Note that we do not impose explicitly that the first period consumption must be positive, as this would complicate
the analysis without bringing any new insight.
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where s∗j is defined by (5) and (7). We then obtain that the threshold for the indifference between
HC and NH is given by ∆V (θ̂) = 0, so that
pθ̂ = u1(W − s∗NH − T )− u1(W − s∗HC(P )− T ) + (1− p) [u(s∗NH)− u(s∗HC(P ))]
+p [u(s∗NH − LNH)− u(s∗HC(P ) + P − LHC) + (1− β)CpC ]
= s∗HC(P )− s∗NH + (1− p) [u(s∗NH)− u(s∗HC(P ))]
+p [u(s∗NH − LNH)− u(s∗HC(P ) + P − LHC)− CpC(β − 1)] , (8)
where the second line is obtained by making use of Assumption 1. We see that this utility
differential does not depend on T , which has to be paid no matter the care type choice. This
equality then defines the threshold θ̂(P ) as a function of the policy instruments, and with all
agents with θ < θ̂(P ) (resp., θ > θ̂(P )) preferring NH to HC (resp., the opposite), given P . We
then have, using the envelope theorem for s∗HC(P ),
∂θ̂
∂P
= −pu′(s∗HC(P ) + P − LHC) < 0. (9)
Intuitively, when P increases, more people wish to use HC as its net cost is decreased, and θ̂
decreases. The intensity of that relationship depends on the magnitude of the risk of becoming
dependent, i.e. p.
Note finally that, as before, any increase in the expected extra cost of the pandemic in NH,
i.e. in (β − 1)pcC, decreases θ̂, and thus, increases the number of people who would prefer to
avoid NH.
3.4 Individual preferences for the public policy
In this section, we assume that agents are proposed an exogenous policy (T , P ) and we look
first at (i) who favors the introduction of this policy, and (ii) how this preference is affected by
(changes in) the perceived pandemic risks.
3.4.1 Political support for the HC policy
It is obvious that an agent who would prefer (T , P ) to (0,0) chooses HC rather than NH with
(T , P ) (otherwise, in NH he/she would pay a tax and receive no transfer, and would be better
off without the policy).
Let us assume for the moment that, in the absence of the policy (T , P ), the best option of
an agent with θ would be to go to NH. This means that, for this agent, θ < θ̂(0), where the
latter is defined as in equation (8) with P = 0.
Such an agent would then be in favor of the introduction of the policy (T , P ) if
W − s∗NH + (1− p)u(s∗NH) + pu(s∗NH − LNH)− CpC (1 + p (β − 1))
< W − s∗HC(P )− T + (1− p)u(s∗HC(P )) + pu(s∗HC(P )− LHC + P )− CpC + pθ,
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so that the agent with θ̃ such that
pθ̃ = (s∗HC(P )− s∗NH) + T + (1− p) (u(s∗NH)− u(s∗HC(P )))
+p [u(s∗NH − LNH)− u(s∗HC(P )− LHC + P )− CpC(β − 1)] , (10)
where s∗HC(P ) and s
∗
NH are defined by (5) and (7) respectively, is indifferent between the two.
All individuals with θ < θ̃(T, P ) prefer (NH with) T = P = 0, while all with θ > θ̃(T, P ) prefer
(HC with) (T , P ). This threshold decreases in the extra cost of the pandemic in NH, i.e. in
(β − 1)pcC.
Note the difference between θ̂(P ) and θ̃(T, P ). The threshold θ̂(P ) determines who prefers
HC to NH in the presence of a policy (T , P ). It is the choice made in the last stage of the game,
when (T , P ) has already been imposed. The threshold θ̃(T, P ) rather determines who favors
(or not) the policy (T , P ), in the case where this individual prefers NH to HC in the absence
of the policy. This explains why θ̃ is a function of T (which is paid only in one branch of the
comparison) while θ̂ is not (since it is paid in both branches).
It remains to be checked that θ̃(T, P ) < θ̂(0). This condition is equivalent to
T < s∗HC(0)− s∗HC(P ) (11)
+(1− p) [u(s∗HC(P ))− u(s∗HC(0))]
+p [u(s∗HC(P )− LHC + P )− u(s∗HC(0)− LHC)] ,
which is true if T is small enough or P is large enough.29 The condition is intuitive. An agent
with a value of θ low enough to prefer NH over HC in the absence of a social program (i.e. with
θ below θ̂(0)) requires the program to be generous enough (small tax and/or large transfer) to
favor this policy (and move to HC to benefit from it).
To summarize the analysis so far, the support for an exogenous (T , P ) among those with
θ < θ̂(0) is given by: F (θ̂(0))− F (θ̃(T, P )) if condition (11) is satisfied, and by zero otherwise.
Assuming that the condition is satisfied, the derivative of the political support for (T , P )
with respect to the utility cost of the disease, C (among those who prefer NH in the absence of




− f(θ̃(T, P ))∂θ̃(T, P )
∂C
= −pC(β − 1)
[
f(θ̂(0))− f(θ̃(T, P ))
]
T 0
so that it is not clear whether an increase in C increases or decreases the support for the
policy, among those who initially preferred the NH option. Note that the first term on the
right-hand side, −pC(β − 1)f(θ̂(0)), is the marginal density of those who switch from NH to
HC when facing a higher pandemic risk, even in the absence of the subsidy. The second term,
pC(β−1)f(θ̃(T, P )), is the marginal density of those who become in favor of the policy but who
29Using the envelope theorem for s∗HC(P ), we can prove that the RHS of (11) increases with P . Note that this
assumption is satisfied if the social program (T, P ) is actuarially fair.
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would have still chosen NH in the absence of the subsidy. So, assuming for instance a uniform
distribution, this expression becomes null so that the support for (T , P ) among the agents who
prefer NH when there is no policy, is independent of C (equivalently, also independent of pc or
β).
Note that, if condition (11) is not satisfied, it means that the program proposed is not
generous enough to attract the favor of those who prefer NH in the absence of the program.
We now turn to those individuals with θ > θ̂(0). Such agents would then be in favor of the
introduction of the policy (T , P ) if:
W − s∗HC(0) + (1− p)u(s∗HC(0)) + pu(s∗HC(0)− LHC)− CpC + pθ (12)
< W − s∗HC(P )− T + (1− p)u(s∗HC(P )) + pu(s∗HC(P )− LHC + P )− CpC + pθ,
which corresponds exactly to condition (11).
If this condition is satisfied, then all agents with θ > θ̂(0) are in favor of (T , P ). Once more,
the policy has to be generous enough to attract some support. But in this case, the specific
value of the individual preference for HC, θ, plays no role (provided of course that θ > θ̂(0))
since those agents compare two situations (with and without the program) where they anyway
prefer HC to NH.
If condition (12) (or equivalently, condition (11)) is satisfied, then the support for (T , P )
among those agents who initially preferred HC, is given by 1− F (θ̂(0)) and its derivative with
respect to C is given by:
−f(θ̂(0))∂θ̂(0)
∂C
= pC(β − 1)f(θ̂(0)) > 0.
More agents then prefer HC with public policy (T, P ) as C (or pC or β) increases.
If condition (12) is not satisfied, then the policy (T, P ) has no support (neither among those
with θ < θ̂(0) nor among those with θ > θ̂(0)).
We then have two possible cases, depending on whether (11) is satisfied or not. In the
following proposition, we sum up the above findings and show how the support within the entire
population changes when the expected cost of the pandemic increases.
Proposition 3. (i) If T is small enough compared to P that (11) is satisfied, then the fraction
of agents in favor of (T , P ) is given by:
S(T, P ) = 1− F (θ̃(T, P )),
and increases with C (as well as with β and pC) since:
∂S(T, P )
∂C
= −f(θ̃(T, P ))∂θ̃(T, P )
∂C
= pC(β − 1)f(θ̃(T, P )) > 0.
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(ii) If T is large enough compared to P that (11) is not satisfied, then no one is in favor of
(T , P ).
Figure 1 below summarizes the partition of the society between those who prefer NH over
HC in the absence of the policy as well as the partition of the society between those who favor
the policy and those who do not.
Figure 1: Partition of the population when (11) is satisfied.
Proposition 3 also informs us about how the support for (T , P ) (i.e., the set of people in
favor of the policy) varies with the risk of a pandemic. We show that θ̃(T, P ) and θ̂(0) decrease
with C, translating into a larger set of agents favoring the policy (T, P ).
In this first step of the analysis, we stepped aside from the intensity of the preferences for
the policy and focused on how a pandemic risk would affect who will support the policy. In the
next subsection, we study the intensity of individuals’ preference for the policy.
3.4.2 Preference intensity
For a given care preference, θ, the intensity of the preferences for or against the policy could
be affected by the pandemic risk. This is what we are interested in in this second step of our
analysis.
We define the intensity of the preference for policy (T, P ) of an agent with type θ, denoted
by I(θ, T, P ), as the difference between the utility levels attained with and without the policy.
In each case (i.e., with and without the policy), the agent chooses her optimal care type. We
know from above that agents with θ < θ̂(P ) choose NH while the others choose HC, given the
proposed transfer P . We also know that θ̂ decreases with P , so that θ̂(P ) < θ̂(0). We then face
three types of agents: (i) those with θ < θ̂(P ) choose NH whether the policy (T, P ) is enacted
or not, (ii) those with θ > θ̂(0) choose HC in both cases, and (iii) those with θ̂(P ) < θ < θ̂(0)
prefer NH in the absence of the transfer, but switch to HC when the policy (T, P ) is enacted.
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Figure 2: Long-term care preferences, and support for home-care subsidy
differential I(θ, T, P ) is given by:
VNH(θ, T, P )− VNH(θ, 0, 0) = −T.
These agents dislike the program (since θ < θ̂(P ) < θ̃(T, P )) because they pay its tax cost
without enjoying its benefit.30
Agents with θ > θ̂(0) remain in HC with and without the policy, so that their utility
differential I(θ, T, P ) is given by:
VHC(θ, T, P )− VHC(θ, 0, 0) = s∗HC(0)− s∗HC(P )− T
+(1− p) [u(s∗HC(P ))− u(s∗HC(0))]
+p [u(s∗HC(P )− LHC + P )− u(s∗HC(0)− LHC)] , (13)
whose sign is positive under condition (11).
Finally, the most interesting case consists in studying the change in preferences of agents
with θ̂(P ) < θ < θ̂(0). For them, the utility differential I(θ, T, P ) is given by:
VHC(θ, T, P )− VNH(θ, 0, 0) = (s∗NH − s∗HC(P ))− T + (1− p) (u(s∗HC(P ))− u(s∗NH))
+p [u(s∗HC(P )− LHC + P )− u(s∗NH − LNH) + CpC(β − 1) + θ] ,
30Comparing (8) and (10), we obtain:





and is negative if θ < θ̃(T, P ) and positive otherwise. Both groups will choose NH in the absence
of the policy and HC under the policy. But the utility gain from switching to HC is linearly
increasing in θ, leaving only those with high enough θ, i.e. θ > θ̃(T, P ), being in favor of the
policy.
Figure 2 depicts the intensity of the preference for the public policy, I(θ, T, P ), as a function
of the agent’s type θ.
We now study how this intensity is affected by an increase in NH aversion. This higher NH
aversion can take the form of either an increase in C, pC or β, or equivalently of an increase in
θ. It will prove easier to discuss the second possibility. We then assume that the pandemic risk
results in an increase in the value of θ of each agent by the same amount ∆θ > 0.
Agents with initial θ < θ̂(P )−∆θ remain in NH with and without the policy, even after the
pandemic shock, and thus see the intensity of their preferences against the policy unaffected,
i.e. I(θ, T, P ) = −T before and after the pandemic. In terms of Figure 2, they remain on the
flat part of the curve on the left despite the increase in NH aversion ∆θ. Likewise, agents with
initial θ > θ̂(0) remain in HC with and without the policy, before and after the pandemic shock.
The intensity of their preferences in favor of the policy is then also unaffected by the shock and
equal to (13). They remain on the flat portion of the curve on the right.
All other agents see the intensity of their preference for the policy increased following the
pandemic shock. In terms of Figure 2, the increase in ∆θ moves them to a higher portion of the
curve. We can identify three subgroups among those types: (i) agents with θ̂(P ) < θ < θ̂(0)−∆θ
prefer NH without the policy and HC with the policy, before and after the shock, (ii) agents
with θ̂(P )−∆θ < θ < θ̂(P ) prefer NH without the policy but move to HC with the policy only
once the shock occurs, (iii) agents with θ̂(0)−∆θ < θ < θ̂(0) prefer HC even without the policy
after the shock.
We will come back to this analysis in a more detailed way in Section 5.3.2.
4 Data
The empirical analysis we implement in Section 5 uses data from a survey we conducted as
a partnership with AskingCanadians, an online panel survey organization. The survey was
fielded to residents of the Canadian provinces of Quebec and Ontario aged 50-69 years, between
December 18th and December 31st 2020. We constructed survey weights by age, gender, and
education using the 2016 Canadian Census to correct for under- and oversampling of certain
subgroups, and make it representative of the Ontarian and Quebec population. For questions
for which we expected a significant proportion of missing information, such as income, we use
unfolding brackets. We then use multiple imputation to assign missing values with information
from the bracketing, conditional on basic socio-demographic covariates (age and gender).
Respondents could choose to answer the survey questionnaire in English or French. On
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completion of the survey, respondents received a loyalty reward from their choice of retailer
(respondents could choose from a list of major retailers such as Walmart, Petro-Canada, and
Hudson’s Bay). In total, 3,004 respondents completed the survey.
The questionnaire consists of six main parts: questions about (i) demographics (includ-
ing age, gender, education, marital status, number of children, health condition), (ii) financial
situation (employed or retired, income level, savings amounts and composition, mortgage and
property value), (iii) risk perceptions (regarding mortality and needing help with activities of
daily living) and (iv) preferences (regarding risk aversion, preference for care from children and,
preferences for leaving bequests), (v) a set of strategic survey questions (not used for this pa-
per) and (vi) a set of COVID-related questions. The entire questionnaire can be found in the
Appendix A (except for part (v)).
Table 1 summarizes the main socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of our sample
once weights are used, and compares these characteristics with those in the 2016 Census and
the January 2021 Labour Force Survey for those aged between 50 and 69. Consistent with the
construction of our weights, our survey delivers statistics for age, education and gender similar
to those in the Census. In terms of marital status, our sample delivers figures broadly in line
with those in the Census although it was not used in the construction of the survey weights. In
particular, about two thirds of our respondents have a spouse or partner. A little more than
half of our sample is employed and about a third is retired. These figures align well with figures
from the Labour Force Survey for the same age range although the work status categories do
not map perfectly (see table notes). About two-thirds of our respondents have at least one
child, and a vast majority of those have at least one child living less than 20 kilometers away.
Mean individual income is about $64,000. By comparison, according to Statistic Canada, mean
income in Ontario in 2019 was respectively $69,000 and $57,000 for those aged 45 to 54 and
those aged 55 to 65. For Quebec, the figures are $65,400 and $48,600.31 Finally, given that our
respondents are relatively old and have had time to accumulate wealth, average household (net)
wealth (or net worth) in our sample is quite large at about $765,000.
5 Empirical results
Section 3 examined the theoretical implications of nursing home aversion post-pandemic on
late-in-life precautionary savings and on the support for a policy subsidizing home care. As
shown in Proposition 2, nursing home aversion increases due to a pandemic if the perceived
relative exposure to a pandemic in a nursing home compared to home care (β) increases, if the
overall perceived risk of a pandemic (C and pC) increases (given β > 1), or if individuals update
negatively their preferences for nursing home care versus home care (equivalent to an upward
shift in the distribution of θ) following new (negative) information about nursing homes (e.g.
31See https://doi.org/10.25318/1110023901-eng
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Our survey Census / LFS










Widowed, separated, divorced 18.2 18.3
Never married 16.4 10.7
Education (%)
High school or less 43.2 43.2
College 35.3 35.3
University 21.5 21.5
Has a child (%) 66.8 -




Not working / Looking for work 9.6 5.2
Individual income (average, $) 64,028 -
Household wealth (average, $) 765,205 -
Notes: The table compares the weighted statistics from our survey to statistics for similar variables in the 2016
Census and in the January 2021 Labour Force Survey (the latter is only used for work status). There is not a
perfect mapping between our work status categories and those in the LFS. In the LFS, we classify those “employed
at work” or “employed, absent from work” as “employed,” those “absent from work / unemployed” as not “not
working / looking for work” and the rest (those “not in the labour force”) as “retired.”
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about the general quality of the care provided). Also as shown in Proposition 2, a higher nursing
home aversion should increase the likelihood to save more (as the cost of home care is higher).
In addition, as the model predicts that those who plan to use home care would favor a policy
which subsidizes it, we expect the additional support for such a policy post-pandemic to stem
mainly from those whose nursing home aversion increases, and would now prefer to use HC.32
In this section, we provide survey-based empirical evidence for these theoretical predictions.
Recall that our sample is aged between 50 and 69 years, so that the questions are not about
their immediate use of LTC during the current pandemic but about what they expect to do
post-pandemic, as they age.33
5.1 General patterns
Table 2 summarizes the responses to the key questions related to these predictions (see Appendix
A for the questionnaire). First, nursing home aversion post-pandemic is widespread among older
Canadians (Panel A). More than 70% of the respondents reported being less inclined to enter
a nursing home. This is not surprising given the media coverage of the COVID-19 outbreaks
at nursing homes. To help understand what is behind the change in the inclination, the survey
further asks how the respondents’ views on nursing homes, in terms of the exposure to health
risks, have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic (Panel B). Again not surprisingly, the
current pandemic led them to believe that being in a nursing home will make them more vulner-
able to health risks (with almost no difference between private and public nursing homes in that
regard). Relating these findings to our theoretical model (see Proposition 2), this is equivalent
to considering an increase in β, if we believe that the health risk respondents had in mind was
a higher exposure to a pandemic. Yet, this could also be interpreted as a general upward shift
in the θ distribution if we believe that these responses reflect more a loss of confidence about
nursing homes in protecting against general health risks.
Consistent with the theoretical prediction (see Proposition 2), intended savings for older
ages increase and the willingness to avoid going to a nursing home seems to be a key driver
of these higher intended savings (Panel C). Slightly more than a quarter of the sample (27%)
reported being willing to save more for older ages because of the pandemic (69% reported no
change, while only 4% reported being less willing to save due to the pandemic). Among those
who indicated a higher willingness to save, the vast majority (83%) said it is to avoid entering
a nursing home.
The attitude towards a policy that subsidizes home care (see Panel D) is also consistent
with the theoretical prediction (see Proposition 3). The exact question asked is: “Suppose the
government were to propose a policy to increase the access to home care for people needing help
with activities of daily living (ADLs) in order to reduce their likelihood of going to a nursing
32See Proposition 3 and Section 3.4.2.
33Our survey excludes any respondent who has already been using LTC services.
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Table 2: Intended nursing home use, savings, and preferences for home-care subsidies post-pandemic
A. Intended nursing home use
More inclined to enter a nursing home 2.1%
No change 26.1%
Less inclined to enter a nursing home 71.7%
N 2,516
B. View on the exposure to health risks at nursing homes
1) Public nursing homes 2) Private nursing homes
Improved 12.9% Improved 11.7%
No change 18.3% No change 17.8%
Worsened 68.9% Worsened 70.5%
N 2,795 N 2,803
C. Saving for older ages
1) Changes in willingness to save 2) Save more to avoid a nursing home?*
Save more 26.9% Yes 82.7%
No change 69.1% No 17.3%
Save less 4.1%
N 2,755 N 649
D. View on home-care subsidy
1) Opinion on the policy 2) Changes in the opinion
Very much agree 20.2% More in favor 37.9%
Agree 48.2% No change 49.6%
Disagree 20.1% Less in favor 12.5%
Very much disagree 11.5%
N 2,504 N 2,294
Note: The number of respondents who completed the survey is 3,004. The tabulation for each question in
this table does not include those who chose “Don’t know” or “Prefer not to say” as well as those who skipped
the question. All the tabulations use the sampling weights.
*This is a follow-up question for those who reported the willingness to save more.
home, but would increase taxes to finance this policy. What do you think would be your opinion
about such a policy?” The question thus makes it explicit that such a policy would not be costless
and would likely result in higher taxes. Nonetheless, a majority of respondents indicated they
would support this policy (20% very much agreed while another 48% agreed). Many (38%) also
reported that the pandemic made them more favorable to such a policy (only 13% reported
being less in favor due to the pandemic).
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The unconditional distributions of the survey responses are therefore in line with the pre-
dictions from Section 3. Older Canadians become less inclined to use nursing homes, which,
in turn, increases their intended savings on the one hand and makes them more favorable to a
policy subsidizing home care on the other hand. In the remainder of this section, we present
evidence suggesting that the increase in the willingness to save as well as the support for home-
care subsidies stem from individuals shying away from nursing homes. We also investigate which
socioeconomic characteristics predict nursing home aversion, changes in precautionary savings,
and support for home-care subsidies.
Table 3 examines the sample characteristics of the respondents who declared to be less in-
clined to enter a nursing home due to the pandemic relative to the other respondents. Those who
express a higher nursing home aversion (i.e. those who are less inclined to enter a nursing home)
post-pandemic are, in comparison with those whose nursing home aversion did not increase, more
likely to be Québécois (as opposed to Ontarians), older, females, to live in common-law unions,
to hold a university degree and to be retired. On the other hand, we do not find a meaningful
difference in whether they have a child or not (also whether they have a child living close), as
well as in average income and net worth. Overall, these results show that increased nursing
home aversion is not confined to a specific socioeconomic group.
5.2 Nursing home aversion and savings
Table 2C already established that the increase in the willingness to save more is mainly driven by
nursing home aversion. We confirm the link between the two by estimating a linear probability
model where the dependent variable is the dummy variable of planning to save more due to the
pandemic while the key explanatory variable is the dummy variable of being less inclined to
enter a nursing home post-pandemic.
As being less inclined to go to a nursing home because of the pandemic might be correlated
with demographic or socioeconomic variables such as age or education (see Table 3), we also
control for a large set of potential confounding variables. We control for wealth, income, risk
aversion, gender, age, province, education, marital status, for whether the respondent has any
child, for whether the respondent has any child living close, and for the number of diagnosed
health problems and for work status (see Appendix B for further details).34
Table 4 shows the estimation results. Results without controls suggest that being less inclined
to enter a nursing home increases the chance of being willing to save more by 8.5 percentage
points, which is about one-third of the unconditional average reported in Table 2C. Adding
controls (Column (2)), the point estimate is even larger, at 10.5 percentage points. Both esti-
mates are statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimated patterns are similar when the
34We use imputed values for income although not including respondents for whom income was imputed delivers
similar results. Also, we did not include the risk perceptions of respondents (i.e. the probabilities of needing help
with ADLs and survival probabilities) as controls, as it significantly reduces the number of observations. Running
similar regressions controlling only for these variables delivers comparable point estimates to those reported here.
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Table 3: Who are less inclined to enter a nursing home post-pandemic?
(1) (2) (3)
Not less inclined Less inclined Difference
(2) - (1)
Québec province (%) 33.6 39.7 +6.1***
Age (%)
50-54 31.9 26.3 -5.5***
55-59 28.6 25.9 -2.7
60-64 22.0 24.3 +2.2
65-69 17.5 23.5 +6.0***
Female (%) 47.6 51.7 +4.1*
Marital status (%)
Married 52.8 51.6 -1.2
Common-law 11.9 15.3 +3.3**
Widowed, separated, divorced 20.8 17.8 -3.0*
Never married 14.5 15.3 +0.9
Education (%)
High school or less 44.5 38.4 -6.1***
College 29.8 30.5 +0.7
University 25.7 31.1 +5.4***
Has a child (%) 69.1 68.6 -0.5
Has a child < 20km (%) 53.1 51.7 -1.4
Work status (%)
Employed 61.8 51.8 -10.0***
Retired 29.7 39.6 +9.9***
Not working / Looking for work 8.5 8.6 +0.1
Individual income (average, $) 67,767 65,313 -2,454
Household wealth (average, $) 772,824 873,181 100,357
Note: All the tabulations use the sampling weights. *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and
1% level respectively.
sample weights are not used (Columns (3) and (4)). If anything, the point estimates are larger.
These results confirm that nursing home aversion is one of the main drivers of the increase in
the intended saving post-pandemic and that this is not sensitive to controlling for a large set of
demographic and socioeconomic variables.
In terms of covariates, we find that that being in Ontario, having a child within 20 kilometers,
and being at work predict a higher likelihood to be willing to save more for older ages because
of the pandemic (see Table B.1 in the Appendix for details).
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Table 4: Nursing home aversion and saving for older ages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Less inclined to enter a nursing home .085*** .105*** .112*** .140***
(.028) (.028) (.019) (.020)
N 2,374 2,261 2,374 2,261
adj. R2 0.007 0.048 0.012 0.065
Controls N Y N Y
Use sampling weights Y Y N N
Note: This table presents OLS regression results where the dependent variable is whether
respondent plans to save more due to the pandemic. Robust standard errors are in paren-
theses. See the text for the control variables included.
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
5.3 Nursing home aversion and home-care subsidy
5.3.1 Support for home-care subsidy
Next, we examine the relationship between the support for a policy that subsidizes home care
and increased nursing home aversion. To do so, Figure 3 first plots the percentage of those who
“very much disagree,” “disagree,” “agree,” and “very much agree” with the policy, separately for
those whose nursing home aversion has increased and the rest. Among those who report to be
less inclined to go to a nursing home, 23.8% report they very much agree with the policy, against
13.2% of those who declared to be more or equally inclined to go to a nursing home. Hence,
this figure suggests that increased nursing home aversion increases the support for home-care
subsidy by increasing the probability to “very much agree” with the policy at the expense of the
probabilities to “disagree” or simply “agree” with the policy. The most important shift seems
to be from the “agree” response to the “very much agree” one.
To confirm this, we present in Table 5 the estimation results from multinomial logit models
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable of the support for such a policy in four
categories (“very much agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” and “very much disagree”), while the key
explanatory variable is being less inclined to enter a nursing home post-pandemic. The same set
of control variables as in Table 4 are used. Each column shows the average marginal effects of
nursing home aversion in each model. Without any controls (Column (1)), we find, in line with
Figure 3, that increased nursing home aversion raises the chances of very much agreeing with
subsidizing home care. Indeed, among those respondents who declared to be less inclined to
enter a nursing home, their chances to very much agree with the policy is about 12 percentage
points higher. This increase in the likelihood to very much agree with the policy is more
than half the share of those who very much agree with such a policy (Table 2D). The effect is


























1. Very much disagree 2. Disagree 3. Agree 4. Very much agree
Agreement with HC policy by change in NH inclination
NOT less inclined to go to NH less inclined to go to NH
Figure 3: Agreement with home-care subsidy by change in inclination to go to a nursing home
Notes: This figure uses sampling weights.
controls (Column (2)). They are also robust to not using sampling weights though the estimated
magnitudes are slightly smaller in that case. In line with what we observe in Figure 3, the table
confirms that increased nursing home aversion increases the probability to very much agree with
the policy at the expense mostly of the probability to simply agree with the policy.
To map these empirical results to our theoretical model and to make sense of the observed
patterns, we first reproduce, in Figure 4, the relationship between LTC preferences and the
support for home-care subsidy from Figure 2 in Section 3.4.2. Recall that the vertical axis
of this figure displays the (net) valuation of the subsidy P (with corresponding taxes T ) as a
function of the relative preference for home care (θ). This valuation, denoted I(θ, T, P ), is the
difference between the utility with the subsidy V (θ, T, P ) and without the subsidy V (θ, 0, 0),
measured for the chosen type care in each case. Those with θ < θ̂(P ) choose to go to a nursing
home (conditional on needing care) even with the subsidy, and hence, they exhibit the lowest
support for this policy. On the other hand, those with θ > θ̂(0) would choose home care even
without the subsidy, and so they value the subsidy the most. Those with θ ∈ [θ̂(P ), θ̂(0)] will
use home care only if the subsidy is implemented. Their support for the policy increases with
θ, where the cut-off for being in favour of the policy is θ̃(T, P ).
We map the level of support for the subsidy in Figure 4 to the four categories of policy
support in Table 5 in the following way. The cutoff between “agree” and “disagree” with
the policy corresponds to θ̃(T, P ), with a negative (resp., positive) net benefit from the policy
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Table 5: Support for home-care subsidy and nursing home aversion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Very much agree .1180*** .1001*** .0943*** .0732***
(.0263) (.0271) (.0224) (.0230)
Agree -.0769** -.0789*** -.0663*** -.0673***
(.0308) (.0319) (.0244) (.0252)
Disagree -.0385 -.0334 -.0216 -.0089
(.0254) (.0255) (.0183) (.0190)
Very much disagree -.0022 .0123 -.0063 .0029
(.0195) (.0187) (.0149) (.0154)
N 2,229 2,134 2,229 2,134
Controls N Y N Y
Use sampling weights Y Y N N
Note: This table presents the average marginal effects of being less inclined to
enter a nursing home on being in each category of support for a policy that sub-
sidizes home care, estimated from multinomial logit regressions. Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. See the text for the control variables included.
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
below (resp., above). There is some arbitrariness in the thresholds used to separate “very much
disagree” from “disagree” (I) and “very much agree” from “agree” (I), and we assume that the
former is above the minimum level of support (i.e. the level of support arising from those with
θ < θ̂(P )) while the latter is below the maximum level of support (i.e. that from those with
θ > θ̂(0)), as depicted in Figure 4. The corresponding thresholds in terms of preferences are
denoted θI and θI .
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We model the nursing home aversion caused by the pandemic in the following way. The
distribution of θ before the pandemic is denoted by F (θ). During the pandemic, a random
subset of the population learn negative information about nursing homes and hence, their relative
preference for home care increases by ∆θ > 0. These agents form the ‘less-inclined’ group from
Figure 3. As a result, the preference distribution of the less-inclined group is a parallel rightward
shift of that of the complementary group (i.e. the ‘not less inclined’ group in Figure 3).
Under this assumption, the distribution of the policy support within the group with no change
in LTC preferences (i.e. the blue bars in Figure 3) reveals the underlying distribution F (θ) pre-
pandemic. A majority (52.7%) belong to the “agree” category (i.e., those with θ ∈ (θ̃(T, P ), θI)).
They would have used home care only with the subsidy and would have obtained positive net
35These thresholds may vary across respondents, but this does not affect our analysis of the impact of nursing
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Figure 4: Long-term care preferences and mapping to the categories of the support for HC
subsidy
utility from such a subsidy. About one-fifth (22.9%) would have used home care with the
subsidy though they would have preferred not having such a policy. For a small fraction of the
population, the subsidy would have had no effect on their choice, putting them in either of the
two extreme categories in terms of the policy support.
Regarding the impact of the nursing home aversion on the policy support, the model predicts
that the less-inclined group should have a stronger support for the policy compared to the
complementary group. In particular, the chance that those who belong to the less-inclined group
would “very much agree” with the policy should increase (by
∫ θI
θI−∆θ
dF (θ)), while the chance
that they would “very much disagree” with the policy should decrease (by
∫ θI
θI−∆θ dF (θ)). As a
result, for the middle two categories, the expected change in the proportions of people belonging
to these categories is ambiguous as there is an outflow to the category on the right as well as
an inflow from the category on the left. A large and positive marginal effect of nursing home
aversion on the chance of “very much agreeing” with the policy in Table 5 indeed support the
prediction from the model. We do not find statistically significant evidence that nursing home
aversion reduces the chance of “very much disagreeing” with the policy, but only a very small
fraction of the population belonged to this category of the policy support to begin with (Figure
3). Lastly, a significant and negative marginal effect on the “agree” category suggests that the
outflow from this category to the “strongly agree” category is much larger than the inflow from
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the “disagree” to the “agree” category (i.e.
∫ θ̃(T,P )
θ̃(T,P )−∆θ dF (θ) <
∫ θI
θI−∆θ
dF (θ)). This is consistent
with the fact that there were much fewer people “disagreeing” with the policy compared to those
who “agreed” with the policy pre-pandemic (Figure 3). So overall, the empirical results on the
impact of nursing home aversion on the policy support are consistent with the key prediction
from the model.
Note that the above interpretation relies on the assumption that the less-inclined group
is drawn randomly from the pre-pandemic distribution of θ, which also implies no correlation
between the chance of having a shift in the preference (∆θ) and the pre-pandemic preference (θ).
Since our regressions control for many demographic and socio-economic variables, the identified
effects are free from potential correlation between the pre-pandemic preference and the impact
of the pandemic that can be explained by those controls. In the next subsection, we look at the
self-declared change in support for the policy because of the pandemic which de facto tackles
concerns about unobserved heterogeneity.
Marginal effects of the controls entering columns 2 and 4 of Table 5 are reported in Tables
B.2 and B.3 in the Appendix. We find that those in the top three wealth quartiles are more in
favor of the policy (compared to those in the bottom wealth quartile) but that being in the top
income quartile reduces the support for the policy (compared to those in the bottom income
quartile). We also find that Québécois, those with at least a high school diploma, those who
are currently working, those with more health problems, and those divorced or separated tend
to be more in favor of such a policy.
5.3.2 Change in support for home-care subsidy
We saw that increased nursing home aversion is associated with more support for a policy
subsidizing home care. However, the previous estimates might not reflect any causal effect of
increased nursing home aversion on the support for such a policy, as increased nursing home
aversion and pre-pandemic support for the policy might be positively associated.
However, our survey also asked respondents how their support for such a policy changed
because of the pandemic, and we confirm that increased nursing home aversion is also associated
with increased support for a home-care subsidy after the COVID pandemic, which provides
support for our interpretation in Section 5.3.1. To show this, Figure 5 first plots the change in
the agreement with the policy separately for those less inclined to go to a nursing home because
of the pandemic and for the rest. This figure suggests that increased nursing home aversion is
associated with a much higher probability to be more in favor of the policy after the pandemic.
In Table 6, we further report the results from a multinominal logit estimation where the setup
is identical to that in Table 5 except that the dependent variable is a dummy of the categories
on the change in the support (“less in favor,” “more in favor,” and “no change”) for home-care
subsidy due to the pandemic. In line with Figure 5, being less inclined to use a nursing home
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Change in agreement with HC policy by change in NH inclination
NOT less inclined to go to NH less inclined to go to NH
Figure 5: Change in agreement with home-care subsidy by change in inclination to go to a
nursing home
Notes: This figure uses sampling weights.
is robust to including controls and not using sampling weights. This is a large change, given
that it represents about two-thirds of the fraction of those who became more in favor of such a
policy (i.e. 38%, see Table 2D).
Our model, summarized in Figure 4, predicts that the less-inclined group, whose relative
preference for home care increased by ∆θ > 0, should be more in favor of a home-care subsidy
(unless they already had a highest level of support, i.e. θ > θ̂(0)). On the other hand, the
complementary group, whose preference (equivalently, the degree of nursing home aversion) was
not affected by the pandemic, should exhibit no change in the support for the policy. Hence,
the estimation results—nursing home aversion increasing the chance of being more in favor of
the policy while decreasing the chance of having no change in the support—are in line with the
predictions from the model.36
Marginal effects of the control variables entering Columns (2) and (4) of Table 6 are reported
in Tables B.4 and B.5 in the Appendix. We find that those in the top three wealth quartiles have
36The less-inclined group is also associated with a higher chance of being less in favor of the policy (around
9 percentage points) though this relationship is much smaller than what we see for the other categories. One
possible explanation is that this pattern is driven by individuals who are generally skeptical about the ability of
governments to deliver appropriate public LTC policies, a feature we do not model. Some evidence seems globally
in line with this explanation, although only suggestive. For instance, among those who became less in favor of
the policy and also became less inclined to go to a nursing home after the pandemic, 73% either disagree or very
much disagree with the policy while for the rest of the sample, this figure is only 28%.
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Table 6: Change in the support for home-care subsidy and nursing home
aversion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No change -.3441*** -.3369*** -.3449*** -.3540***
(.0256) (.0269) (.0208) (.0219)
Less in favor .0949*** .0994*** .0807*** .0938***
(.0282) (.0273) (.0200) (.0206)
More in favor .2492*** .2374*** .2642*** .2602***
(.0315) (.0321) (.0251) (.0261)
N 2,081 2,002 2,081 2,002
Controls N Y N Y
Use sampling weights Y Y N N
Note: This table presents the average marginal effects of being less inclined to
enter a nursing home on being in each category of change in the support for a
policy that subsidizes home care, estimated from multinomial logit regressions.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. See the text for the control vari-
ables included.
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
a higher probability to declare themselves more in favor of the policy because of the pandemic
(compared to those in the bottom wealth quartile), but that being in the top income quartile
reduces this probability (compared to being in the bottom income quartile). Being from Quebec
increases the probability to declare no change in support for the policy, mainly at the expense
of being less in favor of the policy. Educational attainment higher than or equal to completing
high school is associated with a higher probability to be more in favor of the policy. Finally,
being widowed or divorced (compared to being married) and currently not working reduce the
probability to be less in favor of the policy.
To sum up this section, survey evidence reveals that the information older individuals ob-
tained about nursing homes during the pandemic affected their expected choice of LTC, making
them less inclined to enter a nursing home. The individuals that become more averse to entering
a nursing home plan to save more in order to cover the higher cost needed to have proper LTC
at home. At the same time, those individuals also expressed strong support for a policy that
subsidizes home care, which could partially substitute for costly precautionary savings. Our the-




The current COVID pandemic will change many aspects of our life post-pandemic. Its impact
on LTC can be particularly large and persistent, due to COVID outbreaks at nursing homes
during the first wave of the pandemic and negative information about nursing homes people
obtained through the media coverage of these outbreaks. Many people will choose to avoid
entering a nursing home and instead receive LTC at home, notwithstanding the higher cost
of the latter. Our model of LTC choice shows that such nursing home aversion will increase
households’ desired savings for old ages. The model also shows that, since such self-insurance is
costly, households will support a policy that will make home care more affordable. The evidence
from our survey supports all these predictions from our model. Overall, the results of this paper
show the importance of designing appropriate policies that would provide affordable alternatives
to nursing home care for the elderly population, and that these may find strong support in the
population.
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Section 1: Background 
 




QB How old are you? Please Enter. [PN: MUST ENTER THE 2 CHARACTERS.] [RANGE 50-69] 
Numeric  
[PN: TERMINATE IF NOT 50-69 INCLUSIVELY] 
 
QC Which province or territory do you live in?  
1. British Columbia  
2. Alberta  
3. Saskatchewan  
4. Manitoba  
5. Ontario 
6. Quebec 
7. New Brunswick  
8. Nova Scotia  
9. Prince Edward Island  
10. Newfoundland and Labrador  
11. Northwest Territories  
12. Nunavut  
13. Yukon  
14. None of the above  
[PN: TERMINATE IF QC IS NOT 5 or 6] 
 
[PN:  
DEFINE NH_LONG = « long-term care home (CHSLD) » IF QC==6; 
DEFINE NH_LONG = « long-term care home» IF QC==5; 
 
DEFINE NH_SHORT = « CHSLD » IF QC==6; 
DEFINE NH_SHORT = « long-term care home » IF QC==5 
 
DEFINE NH_SHORT2 = « long-term care homes» IF QC==6; 




QD Do you need help with any activities of daily living, that is help with activities such as 
bathing, dressing, eating, walking across a room, and getting in or out of bed? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
A Appendix: Survey questionnaire
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Q1 What is the highest degree, certificate or diploma you have obtained? 
1 Less than high school diploma or its equivalent  
2 High school diploma or a high school equivalency certificate  
3 Trade certificate or diploma  
4 College, CEGEP or other non-university certificate or diploma (other than trade certificates or 
diplomas)  
5 University certificate or diploma below the bachelor's level  
6 Bachelor's degree (e.g. B.A., B.Sc., LL.B.)  
7 University certificate, diploma, degree above the bachelor's level 
 
Q2 What is your marital status? 
1  married 
2  living common-law 
3  widowed 
4  separated 
5  divorced 
6  single, never married 
 
Q2a [PN: ASK IF Q2==1 or 2] How old is your partner (spouse)? [RANGE 18 - 100] 
 
Q3 Do you have any children? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
Q3a [PN: ASK IF Q3==1] How many children do you have who live less than 20km 
away from your main residence? [RANGE 0 - 20] 
 
Q4 At the present time, do you smoke cigarettes daily, occasionally or not at all?  
1 Daily  
2 Occasionally  
3 Not at all   
 
[PN: ASK IF Q4==2 or 3][SHOW ON SAME PAGE AS Q4]  
Q4a Have you ever smoked cigarettes daily?  
1 Yes  
2 No  
 
Q5 Looking at the following list of health conditions, has a doctor ever told you that you 
had:  
[PN: MULTIPLE SELECT] 




3 Lung disease 
4 Diabetes 
5 Hypertension 







Section 2: Financial situation 
 
[PN: THE VARIABLES “RETIRED”, “INCOME” AND “WEALTH” ARE DEFINED THROUGH THIS 
SERIES OF QUESTIONS AND WILL BE USED IN THE EXPERIMENT IN SECTION 6.]  
 
Q6 Which of the following statements best describes your current work situation? Note 
that by being “retired”, we mean that you have stopped working entirely. 
1 Employed (full time, part time, seasonal work) 
2 Retired 
3 Looking for work 
4 Not working, but for reasons other than retired 
8888888 Prefer not to say 
[PN: DEFINE RETIRED=1 IF Q6==2. DEFINE RETIRED=0 OTHERWISE.] 
 
Q7  
For 2019, what is your best estimate of your total income, before taxes and deductions? Please 
include all sources of income, such as salaries and wages, tips, gross self-employment income 
and fees, parental benefits, income received from sole-owner small businesses, pensions, 
investment income, workers’ compensation benefits, social benefits, and gross rental income. If 
you did not have any income in 2019, please enter 0 (zero).  
[PN: PROVIDE BOX FOR NUMERICAL ANSWER] [RANGE: 0 - 2 000 000 $] 
Numeric  
9999999 Don’t know or prefer not to say 
 
[PN: ASK IF Q7==9999999 (ON SAME SCREEN)] 
Q7a Is it more than $60,000? 1 Yes 2 No 7777777 Don’t know 8888888 Prefer not to 
say 
[PN: IF Q7a==7777777 OR 8888888, TYPE_INCOME==12] 
 
[PN: ASK IF Q7a==1 (ON SAME SCREEN)] 
Q7b Is it less than $80,000? 1 Yes 2 No 7777777 Don’t know 8888888 Prefer not to say  
[PN: IF Q7b==1, TYPE_INCOME==2 
IF Q7b==7777777 OR 8888888, TYPE_INCOME==3] 
 
[PN: ASK IF Q7b==2 (ON SAME SCREEN)] 
Q7c Is it more than $100,000? 1 Yes 2 No 7777777 Don’t know 8888888 Prefer not to say  
[PN: IF Q7c==1, TYPE_INCOME==4 
IF Q7c==2, TYPE_INCOME==5 
IF Q7c==7777777 OR 8888888, TYPE_INCOME==6] 
 
[PN: ASK IF Q7a==2 (ON SAME SCREEN)] 
Q7d Is it more than $40,000? 1 Yes 2 No 7777777 Don’t know 8888888 Prefer not to say 
[PN: IF Q7d==1, TYPE_INCOME==7 




[PN: ASK IF Q7d==2 (ON SAME SCREEN)] 
Q7e Is it more than $20,000? 1 Yes 2 No 7777777 Don’t know 8888888 Prefer not to say  
[PN: IF Q7e==1, TYPE_INCOME==9 
IF Q7e==2, TYPE_INCOME==10 
IF Q7e==7777777 OR 8888888, TYPE_INCOME==11] 
 















[PN: DEFINE WEALTH = 0 BEFORE THIS QUESTION.] 
Q8 For each of these saving accounts, please indicate the approximate market value held by 
[IF Q2==1,2, DISPLAY “you and your partner (spouse)”, ELSE DISPLAY “yourself”], if any, 
as of today. If you do not have a certain type of account, please enter 0 (zero) for that 
account. 
Account type 
A. Market value held by 
household (in $)  
_1 RRSP (Registered Retirement 
Savings Plan), both individual and 
group-based  
[FORMAT $99,999,999- 
RANGE $0- $99,999,999] 
 
_2 TFSA (Tax Free Savings 
Account), both individual and 
group-based  
[FORMAT $99,999,999 
RANGE $0- $99,999,999] 
_3 Other registered savings plans 
(for instance, RESP, RDSP, LIRA, 
RRIF, LIF) [PN: Mouse-over 
definitions: Registered Education 
Savings Plan (RESP), Registered 
Disability Savings Plan (RDSP), 
Locked-In Retirement Account 
(LIRA), Registered Retirement 
[FORMAT $99,999,999 
RANGE $0- $99,999,999] 
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Income Fund (RRIF), Life Income 
Funds (LIF)] 
_4 Other savings / investments 
not included above (cash, bank 
accounts, investment accounts 
that are not registered, etc.) 
[FORMAT $99,999,999 
RANGE $0- $99,999,999] 
 
[PN: WEALTH = Q8_1+Q8_2+Q8_3+Q8_4.]  
 
Q9 Do you [IF Q2==1,2, DISPLAY “or your partner (spouse)”] own any of the real estate 
properties listed below? Please select all that apply. 
[PN: MULTI-SELECT, FOR 1 AND 2 ONLY] 
1 Primary residence 
2 Secondary residence or other residential real estate 
9999999 Do not own any residences or other real estate 
 
[PN: ASK IF Q9==1 or 2] 
Q9a Please indicate in the table below your best estimate of the total combined market 
value and mortgage balance outstanding of all your real estate properties.  
 
A. Total real estate 
market value  
B. Total of mortgage 
balances outstanding  
[FORMAT: $99,999,999- 




RANGE $0 TO 2*[value in 







Section 3: Risk Perception  
Next we would like to ask your opinion about how likely you think various events might be. 
When we ask a question, we'd like you to give us a number from 0 to 100, where "0" means 
that you think there is absolutely no chance, and "100" means that you think the event is 
absolutely certain to happen. For example, no one can ever be sure about tomorrow's weather, 
but if you think that rain is very unlikely tomorrow, you might say that there is a 10 percent 
chance of rain. If you think there is a very good chance that it will rain tomorrow, you might say 
that there is an 80 percent chance of rain.  
 
[PN: SHOW Q10-Q12 ON THE SAME SCREEN] 
 
[PN: ASK IF QB<=65] 
Q10 What do you think is the likelihood you will live to age 70? Please enter a number 
between 0 and 100, 0 meaning you expect there is no chance you will live to 70, and 100 
meaning that you will live to 70 with certainty.  
 [PN: PROVIDE BOX FOR NUMERICAL ANSWER] [RANGE: 0 – 100] 
Numeric 
7777777 Don’t know 
8888888 Prefer not to say  
 
[PN: ASK IF QB>65 OR (Q10>0 AND IS NUMERIC) ] 
Q11 What do you think is the likelihood you will live to age 80? Please enter a number 
between 0 and 100, 0 meaning you expect there is no chance you will live to 80, and 100 
meaning that you will live to 80 with certainty. 
[PN: PROVIDE BOX FOR NUMERICAL ANSWER] [RANGE: 0 – [RESPONSE TO Q10]] 
Numeric  
7777777 Don’t know 
8888888 Prefer not to say  
 
[PN: Ask if Q11>0 and is Numeric] 
Q12 What do you think is the likelihood you will live to age 90? Please enter a number 
between 0 and 100, 0 meaning you expect there is no chance you will live to 90, and 100 
meaning that you will live to 90 with certainty. 
[PN: PROVIDE BOX FOR NUMERICAL ANSWER] [RANGE: 0 – [RESPONSE TO Q11]] 
Numeric  
7777777 Don’t know 
8888888 Prefer not to say  
 
[PN: SHOW Q13 – Q14 ON THE SAME SCREEN] 
 
Q13 What do you think is the likelihood that you will need help with any activities of daily 
living, that is activities such as bathing, dressing, eating, walking across a room, and 
getting in or out of bed, for at least one year before you die? 




7777777 Don’t know 
8888888 Prefer not to say  
 
[ASK IF Q13>0 AND IS NUMERIC] 
Q14 What do you think is the likelihood that you will need help with any activities of daily 
living, including bathing, dressing, eating, walking across a room, and getting in or out of 
bed, for at least three years before you die? 
[PN: PROVIDE BOX FOR NUMERICAL ANSWER] [RANGE: 0 – [RESPONSE TO Q11]] 
Numeric  
7777777 Don’t know 





Section 4: Preferences 
 
[PN: All calculated dollar values in this section are to be rounded to the nearest dollar and 
formatted as $X,XXX in English and X XXX $ in French] 
 
 
Q15 Do you agree with the following statements?  
[PN: ANSWERS: 5 Strongly Agree; 4 Agree; 3 Disagree; 2 Strongly Disagree; 1 Don’t know] 
Q15a Parents should set aside money to leave to their children or heirs once they die, even 
when it means somewhat sacrificing their own comfort in retirement. 
Q15b I prefer to live well but for fewer years than to live long and have to sacrifice my quality of 
life. 
Q15c I would rather spend down my wealth quickly because I might not be healthy enough to 
enjoy the money later in life. 
 
[Programming Note: Define INCOME_RISK as INCOME ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST 10,000. If 
INCOME<5,000, define INCOME_RISK as 10,000] 
 
Q16 Please imagine you could choose between the two following situations.   
 
Situation A: Your income is guaranteed to be [INCOME_RISK] per year for the rest 
of your life.  
Situation B: There is a 50% chance your income will be [2*INCOME_RISK] per year 
for the rest of your life and a 50% chance that it will be [(2/3)*INCOME_RISK] [PN: 
Please round this to the nearest 1,000] per year for the rest of your life. 
 
Which situation would you prefer?  
 
1 Situation A 
2 Situation B 
             9999999 Don’t know/refuse to answer 
 
 
[PN: Ask if Q16==1]  
Q16a Now please consider slightly different situations. 
 
Situation A: Your income is guaranteed to be [INCOME_RISK] per year for the rest 
of your life.  
Situation B: There is a 50% chance your income will be [2*INCOME_RISK] per year 
for the rest of your life and a 50% chance that it will be [(4/5)*INCOME_RISK] [PN: 
Please round this to the nearest 1,000] per year for the rest of your life. 
 




1 Situation A 
2 Situation B 
       9999999 Don’t know/refuse to answer 
 
 
[PN: Ask if Q16==2]  
 
Q16b Now please consider slightly different situations. 
 
Situation A: Your income is guaranteed to be INCOME_RISK per year for the rest 
of your life.  
Situation B: There is a 50% chance your income will be [2*INCOME_RISK] per year 
for the rest of your life and a 50% chance that it will be  [(1/2)*INCOME_RISK] [PN: 
Please round this to the nearest 1,000] per year for the rest of your life. 
 
Which situation would you prefer?  
 
1 Situation A 
2 Situation B 




Section 8: On COVID-19 
 
In this last section, we will ask you a few questions about whether the COVID-19 pandemic has 
changed your perception about long-term care and your willingness to set aside money in case 
you should need care in the future.  
 
 
Q27 Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, has your willingness to save for when you are older 
changed?  
1 Yes, I am willing to save less 
2 Yes, I am willing to save more 
3 No 
7777777 Don’t know 
8888888 Prefer not to say  
 
 [PN: Ask If Q27 == 2] 
Q27a You told us that the COVID-19 pandemic has increased your willingness to save 
for when you are older. Is it because it increased your willingness to avoid going to a 
NH_SHORT if you need help with activities of daily living (ADLs)? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
7777777 Don’t know 
8888888 Prefer not to say  
 
 
Q28 Some companies offer insurance products, called long-term care insurance, to cover 
part of the costs of care for people who might need help with activities of daily living 
(ADLs) in the future. Have you ever thought about buying such product? 
1 Yes  
2 No 
7777777 Don’t know 
8888888 Prefer not to say  
 
 [PN: Ask If Q28 == 1] 
Q28a Has the COVID-19 pandemic changed your interest in such a product? 
1 No 
2 Yes, it has decreased my interest in such a product 
3 Yes, it has increased my interest in such a product 
7777777 Don’t know 
8888888 Prefer not to say  
 
 
Q29 Imagine you will need help with activities of daily living (ADLs) in the future. Would you 
say that because of the COVID-19 pandemic, you are  
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1 More inclined to enter a NH_SHORT than before the pandemic. 
2 Less inclined to enter a NH_SHORT than before the pandemic. 
3 As inclined to enter a NH_SHORT as before the pandemic. 
7777777 Don’t know 
8888888 Prefer not to say  
   
Q30 Suppose the government were to propose a policy to increase the access to home care 
for people needing help with activities of daily living (ADLs) in order to reduce their 
likelihood of going to a NH_SHORT, but would increase taxes to finance this policy. What 
do you think would be your opinion about such a policy: 
1 I would very much disagree with this plan.  
 2 I would disagree with this plan.  
3 I would agree with this plan. 
4 I would very much agree with this plan. 
7777777 Don’t know 
8888888 Prefer not to say  
 
 
[PN: Ask If Q30 IS NOT 7777777 and Q30 IS NOT 8888888] 
[PN: SAME SCREEN AS Q30] 
Q30a Has COVID-19 changed your appreciation about these types of policies? 
1 No, it has not changed my view.  
2 Yes, it has made me less favorable to these types of policies.  
3 Yes, it has made me more favorable to these types of policies. 
7777777 Don’t know 
8888888 Prefer not to say  
 
Q31 Which of the statements below do you most agree with? 
1 The recent COVID-19 epidemic did not change my view of exposure to health risks at 
public NH_SHORT2, in general.  
2 The recent COVID-19 epidemic improved my view of exposure to health risks at public 
NH_SHORT2, in general.  
3 The recent COVID-19 epidemic worsened my view of exposure to health risks at public 
NH_SHORT2, in general.  
7777777 I have no opinion on this. 
Q32 Which of the statements below do you most agree with? 
1 The recent COVID-19 epidemic did not change my view of exposure to health risks at 
private NH_SHORT2, in general.  
2 The recent COVID-19 epidemic improved my view of exposure to health risks at private 
NH_SHORT2, in general.  
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3 The recent COVID-19 epidemic worsened my view of exposure to health risks at private 
NH_SHORT2, in general.  
7777777 I have no opinion on this. 
Q33 Which of the statements below do you most agree with? 
 
1 I think that public and private NH_SHORT2 did equally well at managing the recent 
COVID-19 epidemic, in general.   
2 I think that public NH_SHORT2 did better than private NH_SHORT2 at managing the 
recent COVID-19 epidemic, in general.  
3 I think that public NH_SHORT2 did worse than private NH_SHORT2 at managing the 
recent COVID-19 epidemic, in general.  
7777777 I have no opinion on this. 
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B Appendix: Additional results
This section displays the results of the regressions with controls in Tables 4 to 6 with the
estimates for the included control variables.
Our controls are:
• dummies for wealth (or net worth) quartile
• dummies for income quartiles
• dummies for risk aversion categories. The latter are measured using survey question for
risk aversion based on the hypothetical income question from Barsky et al. (1997). The
first category is the most risk averse while the fourth category is the most risk tolerant.
• a dummy for being female
• age
• a dummy for living in Quebec (other respondents are in Ontario)
• dummies for education (the default is having less than a high school diploma)
• dummies for marital status (the default is being married)
• a dummy for whether the respondent has at least one child
• a dummy for whether the respondent has at least one child living less than 20 kilometers
away
• the number of diagnosed health problems
• dummies for work status (the default is working)
Table B.1 corresponds to Table 4 in the main text but shows the estimates for our control
variables.
Table B.2 shows all the marginal effects for the regression in Column (2) of Table 5 in the
main text.
Table B.3 shows all the marginal effects for the regression in Column (4) of Table 5 in the
main text.
Table B.4 shows all the marginal effects for the regression in Column (2) of Table 6 in the
main text.
Table B.5 shows all the marginal effects for the regression in Column (4) of Table 6 in the
main text.
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Table B.1: Nursing home aversion and saving for older ages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
less inclined NH 0.085*** (0.028) 0.105*** (0.027) 0.112*** (0.019) 0.140*** (0.020)
wealth quartile
2nd -0.029 (0.042) -0.006 (0.033)
3rd -0.022 (0.042) -0.019 (0.032)
4th -0.039 (0.045) -0.039 (0.033)
income quartile
2nd 2 0.002 (0.039) 0.019 (0.029)
3rd -0.028 (0.039) -0.012 (0.029)
4th -0.013 (0.042) -0.007 (0.031)
risk category
2nd -0.047 (0.029) -0.030 (0.022)
3rd -0.019 (0.042) -0.014 (0.031)
4th 0.025 (0.045) 0.019 (0.034)
female 0.026 (0.026) 0.016 (0.020)
age -0.004 (0.003) -0.005** (0.002)
Quebec province -0.075*** (0.026) -0.082*** (0.020)
education (wrt < high school)
high school -0.061 (0.084) -0.064 (0.078)
trade -0.072 (0.089) -0.085 (0.081)
college -0.047 (0.084) -0.054 (0.077)
some undergrad. -0.016 (0.091) -0.041 (0.082)
undergrad. -0.050 (0.085) -0.051 (0.077)
grad. -0.027 (0.087) -0.063 (0.078)
marital status (wrt married)
common-law 0.024 (0.037) -0.004 (0.027)
widowed 0.064 (0.062) 0.051 (0.051)
separated 0.036 (0.076) 0.014 (0.052)
divorced 0.033 (0.044) 0.041 (0.033)
never married 0.046 (0.044) 0.027 (0.033)
has a child -0.036 (0.036) -0.021 (0.028)
has a child <20km 0.067** (0.031) 0.045* (0.024)
# health problems 0.023* (0.014) 0.022** (0.011)
work status (wrt working )
retired -0.130*** (0.028) -0.132*** (0.023)
looking for work -0.055 (0.089) -0.046 (0.068)
not working -0.211*** (0.049) -0.153*** (0.046)
constant 0.222*** (0.023) 0.569*** (0.191) 0.180*** (0.016) 0.595*** (0.148)
Use sampling weights Y Y N N
Observations 2374 2261 2374 2261
R2 0.007 0.060 0.012 0.065
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.048 0.012 0.052
Notes: This table presents OLS regression results where the dependent variable is whether respondent plans to save more
due to the pandemic. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. See the text for the control variables included.
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table B.2: Support for home-care subsidy (with controls and weights)
very much disagree disagree agree very much agree
less inclined NH 0.0123 (0.0187) -0.0334 (0.0255) -0.0789** (0.0319) 0.1001*** (0.0271)
wealth quartile
2nd -0.0672* (0.0343) -0.0255 (0.0367) 0.1036** (0.0459) -0.0108 (0.0369)
3rd -0.0577 (0.0360) 0.0132 (0.0388) 0.0736 (0.0454) -0.0291 (0.0353)
4th -0.0940*** (0.0352) -0.0291 (0.0384) 0.1142** (0.0480) 0.0090 (0.0431)
income quartile
2nd 0.0081 (0.0213) -0.0055 (0.0371) 0.0212 (0.0439) -0.0238 (0.0363)
3rd 0.0365 (0.0269) -0.0349 (0.0349) 0.0374 (0.0430) -0.0391 (0.0373)
4th 0.0693** (0.0278) -0.0411 (0.0367) 0.0372 (0.0466) -0.0655* (0.0364)
risk category
2nd -0.0025 (0.0216) -0.0420 (0.0275) 0.0433 (0.0341) 0.0012 (0.0257)
3rd 0.0461 (0.0333) -0.0599* (0.0360) 0.0141 (0.0444) -0.0004 (0.0388)
4th -0.0031 (0.0284) -0.0119 (0.0399) 0.0233 (0.0479) -0.0084 (0.0376)
female -0.0206 (0.0181) -0.0156 (0.0235) 0.0337 (0.0289) 0.0025 (0.0228)
age -0.0025 (0.0020) -0.0007 (0.0028) -0.0012 (0.0032) 0.0043* (0.0025)
Quebec -0.0004 (0.0183) -0.0827*** (0.0253) 0.0176 (0.0291) 0.0655*** (0.0222)
education (wrt < high school)
high school -0.1232* (0.0715) 0.0148 (0.0738) 0.1542* (0.0872) -0.0458 (0.0752)
trade -0.0972 (0.0756) 0.0040 (0.0788) 0.1371 (0.0932) -0.0439 (0.0792)
college -0.0877 (0.0730) -0.0028 (0.0729) 0.1233 (0.0859) -0.0327 (0.0753)
some undergrad. -0.1129 (0.0764) -0.0465 (0.0778) 0.1699* (0.0949) -0.0105 (0.0818)
undergrad. -0.1226* (0.0728) -0.0560 (0.0725) 0.1409 (0.0864) 0.0377 (0.0775)
grad. -0.1247* (0.0734) -0.0814 (0.0740) 0.1250 (0.0886) 0.0812 (0.0798)
marital status (wrt married)
common law 0.0046 (0.0317) -0.0011 (0.0366) -0.0141 (0.0430) 0.0106 (0.0326)
widowed 0.0523 (0.0529) -0.0425 (0.0540) -0.0241 (0.0717) 0.0143 (0.0590)
separated 0.0420 (0.0560) -0.1648*** (0.0290) 0.0935 (0.0713) 0.0293 (0.0576)
divorced -0.0445* (0.0239) -0.0421 (0.0388) 0.0574 (0.0488) 0.0292 (0.0377)
never married -0.0365 (0.0237) 0.0146 (0.0433) -0.0036 (0.0502) 0.0256 (0.0433)
has child 0.0375 (0.0260) 0.0113 (0.0366) 0.0268 (0.0447) -0.0755** (0.0343)
has child <20km -0.0265 (0.0238) -0.0158 (0.0303) -0.0009 (0.0377) 0.0431 (0.0294)
# health problems -0.0073 (0.0115) -0.0120 (0.0127) -0.0005 (0.0154) 0.0198* (0.0117)
work status (wrt working)
retired -0.0030 (0.0213) 0.0240 (0.0305) 0.0611* (0.0344) -0.0820*** (0.0241)
looking for work 0.0344 (0.0652) 0.1047 (0.0892) -0.0005 (0.0925) -0.1386** (0.0572)
not working 0.0342 (0.0431) -0.0434 (0.0480) 0.0012 (0.0670) 0.0080 (0.0707)
Notes: This table presents the average marginal effects of all the variables used on being in each category of support for a
policy that subsidizes home care, estimated from multinomial logit regressions. Sampling weights are used. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table B.3: Support for home-care subsidy (with controls and without weights)
very much disagree disagree agree very much agree
less inclined NH 0.0029 (0.0154) -0.0089 (0.0190) -0.0673*** (0.0252) 0.0732*** (0.0231)
wealth quartile
2nd -0.0782*** (0.0277) -0.0128 (0.0281) 0.0877** (0.0370) 0.0032 (0.0319)
3rd -0.0744*** (0.0280) -0.0004 (0.0283) 0.0779** (0.0364) -0.0031 (0.0312)
4th -0.0758*** (0.0288) -0.0111 (0.0295) 0.0924** (0.0378) -0.0055 (0.0328)
income quartile
2nd 0.0147 (0.0192) 0.0048 (0.0268) 0.0064 (0.0347) -0.0259 (0.0309)
3rd 0.0135 (0.0196) -0.0118 (0.0257) 0.0510 (0.0344) -0.0527* (0.0304)
4th 0.0497** (0.0210) -0.0215 (0.0271) 0.0182 (0.0368) -0.0464 (0.0324)
risk category
2nd -0.0225 (0.0153) -0.0293 (0.0201) 0.0529** (0.0268) -0.0010 (0.0229)
3rd 0.0255 (0.0246) -0.0261 (0.0276) 0.0364 (0.0363) -0.0358 (0.0299)
4th 0.0057 (0.0244) -0.0019 (0.0314) 0.0215 (0.0397) -0.0253 (0.0318)
female -0.0225 (0.0145) 0.0080 (0.0175) 0.0333 (0.0234) -0.0188 (0.0202)
age -0.0019 (0.0015) -0.0004 (0.0018) -0.0034 (0.0025) 0.0057*** (0.0021)
Quebec 0.0053 (0.0139) -0.0584*** (0.0184) 0.0029 (0.0233) 0.0502** (0.0198)
education (wrt < high school)
high school -0.0947 (0.0695) 0.0455 (0.0689) 0.1047 (0.0892) -0.0556 (0.0745)
trade -0.0788 (0.0721) 0.0043 (0.0720) 0.1388 (0.0934) -0.0643 (0.0768)
college -0.0788 (0.0696) 0.0031 (0.0673) 0.0864 (0.0877) -0.0106 (0.0741)
some undergrad. -0.0959 (0.0730) -0.0056 (0.0732) 0.1002 (0.0950) 0.0013 (0.0801)
undergrad. -0.1031 (0.0696) -0.0442 (0.0672) 0.0914 (0.0879) 0.0559 (0.0749)
grad. -0.0998 (0.0702) -0.0506 (0.0688) 0.0725 (0.0898) 0.0779 (0.0769)
marital status (wrt married)
common law 0.0006 (0.0211) 0.0093 (0.0277) -0.0277 (0.0334) 0.0178 (0.0283)
widowed 0.0303 (0.0405) -0.0165 (0.0439) -0.0517 (0.0601) 0.0380 (0.0518)
separated 0.0288 (0.0403) -0.1062*** (0.0353) 0.0331 (0.0614) 0.0443 (0.0557)
divorced -0.0228 (0.0211) -0.0336 (0.0270) 0.0374 (0.0376) 0.0190 (0.0323)
never married -0.0018 (0.0235) -0.0059 (0.0302) -0.0019 (0.0387) 0.0097 (0.0318)
has child 0.0196 (0.0210) 0.0322 (0.0272) -0.0088 (0.0350) -0.0430 (0.0293)
has child <20km -0.0077 (0.0183) -0.0088 (0.0223) -0.0131 (0.0299) 0.0295 (0.0260)
# health problems -0.0044 (0.0078) -0.0082 (0.0093) -0.0076 (0.0123) 0.0202* (0.0105)
work status (wrt working)
retired -0.0113 (0.0168) -0.0120 (0.0208) 0.0752*** (0.0273) -0.0520** (0.0227)
looking for work 0.0089 (0.0480) 0.0439 (0.0640) 0.0349 (0.0773) -0.0877 (0.0618)
not working 0.0210 (0.0359) -0.0119 (0.0408) 0.0390 (0.0539) -0.0480 (0.0471)
Notes: This table presents the average marginal effects of all the variables used on being in each category of support for
a policy that subsidizes home care, estimated from multinomial logit regressions. Sampling weights are not used. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table B.4: Change in the support for home-care subsidy (with controls and weights)
no change less in favor more in favor
less inclined NH -0.3369*** (0.0269) 0.0994*** (0.0273) 0.2374*** (0.0321)
wealth quartile
2nd -0.0167 (0.0470) -0.0688** (0.0338) 0.0855* (0.0450)
3rd -0.0237 (0.0451) -0.0510 (0.0355) 0.0747* (0.0439)
4th -0.0721 (0.0467) -0.0675** (0.0342) 0.1395*** (0.0464)
income quartile
2nd 0.0027 (0.0432) 0.0011 (0.0300) -0.0037 (0.0444)
3rd 0.0077 (0.0408) 0.0206 (0.0313) -0.0283 (0.0424)
4th 0.1073** (0.0438) -0.0274 (0.0278) -0.0799* (0.0439)
risk category
2nd -0.0229 (0.0325) -0.0128 (0.0230) 0.0357 (0.0330)
3rd 0.0107 (0.0434) -0.0312 (0.0279) 0.0206 (0.0449)
4th -0.0320 (0.0521) 0.0010 (0.0370) 0.0310 (0.0493)
female -0.0255 (0.0285) -0.0129 (0.0195) 0.0384 (0.0283)
age 0.0029 (0.0031) -0.0027 (0.0023) -0.0001 (0.0029)
Quebec 0.0836*** (0.0281) -0.0661*** (0.0215) -0.0176 (0.0286)
education (wrt < high school)
high school -0.1347 (0.0901) -0.0472 (0.0665) 0.1820** (0.0805)
trade -0.0555 (0.0951) -0.0758 (0.0703) 0.1313 (0.0839)
college -0.1244 (0.0886) -0.0196 (0.0677) 0.1440* (0.0785)
some undergrad. -0.1796* (0.0956) -0.0584 (0.0716) 0.2381*** (0.0884)
undergrad. -0.1289 (0.0887) -0.0504 (0.0671) 0.1793** (0.0794)
grad. -0.1776** (0.0904) -0.0866 (0.0674) 0.2642*** (0.0812)
marital status (wrt married)
common law -0.0322 (0.0416) 0.0337 (0.0367) -0.0015 (0.0411)
widowed 0.0285 (0.0714) -0.0605* (0.0365) 0.0321 (0.0731)
separated -0.0224 (0.0634) -0.0253 (0.0478) 0.0477 (0.0689)
divorced 0.0745 (0.0470) -0.0537** (0.0256) -0.0208 (0.0463)
never married 0.0035 (0.0504) -0.0304 (0.0321) 0.0269 (0.0502)
has child 0.0599 (0.0430) 0.0049 (0.0313) -0.0649 (0.0420)
has child <20km -0.0616* (0.0360) 0.0021 (0.0246) 0.0595 (0.0364)
# health problems -0.0183 (0.0148) -0.0012 (0.0107) 0.0195 (0.0149)
work status (wrt working)
retired 0.0061 (0.0342) 0.0021 (0.0282) -0.0082 (0.0330)
looking for work -0.0590 (0.0757) 0.0865 (0.0772) -0.0275 (0.0882)
not working -0.0021 (0.0704) -0.0675** (0.0271) 0.0696 (0.0718)
Notes: This table presents the average marginal effects of all the variables on being in each category of change in the support
for a policy that subsidizes home care, estimated from multinomial logit regressions. Sampling weights are used. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. See the text for the control variables included.
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table B.5: Change in the support for home-care subsidy (with controls and without weights)
no change less in favor more in favor
less inclined NH -0.3540*** (0.0219) 0.0938*** (0.0206) 0.2602*** (0.0261)
wealth quartile
2nd -0.0417 (0.0376) -0.0409 (0.0252) 0.0826** (0.0371)
3rd -0.0198 (0.0373) -0.0432* (0.0246) 0.0630* (0.0365)
4th -0.0582 (0.0382) -0.0302 (0.0257) 0.0884** (0.0377)
income quartile
2nd -0.0027 (0.0343) 0.0019 (0.0234) 0.0008 (0.0348)
3rd -0.0076 (0.0337) 0.0106 (0.0228) -0.0029 (0.0344)
4th 0.0467 (0.0364) -0.0230 (0.0218) -0.0238 (0.0364)
risk category
2nd -0.0532** (0.0254) -0.0131 (0.0163) 0.0663** (0.0262)
3rd -0.0045 (0.0351) -0.0211 (0.0214) 0.0256 (0.0354)
4th -0.0476 (0.0414) 0.0261 (0.0288) 0.0215 (0.0407)
female -0.0157 (0.0230) -0.0104 (0.0149) 0.0261 (0.0232)
age 0.0049** (0.0024) -0.0026* (0.0015) -0.0023 (0.0024)
Quebec 0.0951*** (0.0225) -0.0433*** (0.0152) -0.0519** (0.0229)
education (wrt < high school)
high school -0.1184 (0.0934) -0.0373 (0.0699) 0.1557* (0.0807)
trade -0.0757 (0.0979) -0.0650 (0.0722) 0.1407* (0.0846)
college -0.1009 (0.0918) -0.0230 (0.0697) 0.1239 (0.0784)
some undergrad. -0.1530 (0.0980) -0.0464 (0.0733) 0.1994** (0.0865)
undergrad. -0.0980 (0.0918) -0.0657 (0.0691) 0.1637** (0.0786)
grad. -0.1364 (0.0933) -0.0846 (0.0696) 0.2210*** (0.0803)
marital status (wrt married)
common law 0.0030 (0.0333) 0.0049 (0.0227) -0.0079 (0.0335)
widowed 0.0063 (0.0557) -0.0266 (0.0354) 0.0203 (0.0585)
separated -0.0536 (0.0555) 0.0114 (0.0430) 0.0423 (0.0584)
divorced 0.0214 (0.0372) -0.0131 (0.0226) -0.0083 (0.0369)
never married -0.0058 (0.0392) -0.0146 (0.0235) 0.0204 (0.0387)
has child 0.0304 (0.0342) 0.0062 (0.0219) -0.0367 (0.0343)
has child <20km -0.0395 (0.0289) 0.0149 (0.0187) 0.0247 (0.0295)
# health problems -0.0304*** (0.0117) 0.0052 (0.0075) 0.0252** (0.0119)
work status (wrt working)
retired -0.0017 (0.0268) -0.0228 (0.0168) 0.0245 (0.0271)
looking for work -0.0428 (0.0750) 0.0455 (0.0560) -0.0027 (0.0780)
not working -0.0173 (0.0580) -0.0113 (0.0357) 0.0286 (0.0569)
Notes: This table presents the average marginal effects of all the variables on being in each category of change in the
support for a policy that subsidizes home care, estimated from multinomial logit regressions. Sampling weights are not
used. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. See the text for the control variables included.
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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